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Abstract (in English) 
 
A critical issue facing the European Social Forum (ESF) as a protest movement is the 
proposition that European integration is itself a contested concept.  Whereas it is already trivial 
to state that the ESF has an enormous importance in the process of coming up with alternative 
processes ―from below‖ to the various regional and sub-regional processes that presently drive 
European integration, one distinct challenge it has to face is how to reach a broader audience by 
re-negotiating the meanings of critical concepts in the movement discourse. 
  
In problematizing the discourse of European integration, the ESF stresses a fundamental 
criticism of a ―top-down‖ representative democracy and proposes ―a movement for a 
globalization from below.‖  On the Pan-European level, supranational institutions criticized for 
their apparent deficits in democratic accountability. On the national level, representative 
democracies are criticized for being ineffective in the face of increased internationalization 
(ultimately, of globalization) as well as for the insufficiency of their mechanisms of electoral 
accountability in the face of greater political and economic decision making power. 
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Abstrakt (in deutscher Sprache) 
 
Ein entscheidendes Problem, das sich dem Europäischen Sozialforum (ESF) als einer 
Protestbewegung stellt, ist die These, dass die europäische Integration selbst ein umstrittenes 
Konzept sei. Während es geradezu trivial ist zu behaupten, dass das ESF von außerordentlicher 
Bedeutung für die Entstehung der Prozesse „von unten― als Alternative zu den verschiedenen 
Prozessen auf europäischer und subregionaler Ebene sei, die derzeit die europäische Integration 
vorantreiben, ist die Frage, wie durch die Neuverhandlung der Bedeutungen der kritischen 
Konzepte im Diskurs der Bewegung ein breiteres Publikum erreicht werden kann, eine deutliche 
Herausforderung, der es sich gegenüber sieht. 
Mit der Problematisierung des Diskurses über die europäische Integration betont das ESF 
eine grundlegende Kritik an der repräsentativen Demokratie mit ihren „top-down― Prozessen 
und schlägt „eine Bewegung für eine Globalisierung von unten― vor. Auf gesamteuropäischer 
Ebene werden die supranationalen Institutionen wegen des offensichtlichen Defizits an 
demokratischer Verantwortlichkeit kritisiert. Auf nationaler Ebene werden die repräsentativen 
Demokratien sowohl wegen ihrer Ineffizienz angesichts der verstärkten Internationalisierung 
(letzlich Globalisierung) als auch wegen ihrer unzulänglichen Mechanismen der Verantwortung 
gegenüber dem Wähler angesichts größer werdender politischer und ökonomischer 
Entscheidungsmacht kritisiert. 
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Introduction 
The Beginnings—The World Social Forum and its European Counterpart 
The Noughties1 have witnessed the emergence of the Social Forum Movement, born out of 
the Seattle WTO protests in 1999, which first became visible on the world stage in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil, in January 2001, under the moniker, The World Social Forum (WSF). The forum intended 
to be the countermovement to the World Economic Forum (WEF), an annual meeting of world 
leaders and private industry leaders to ―improve the state of the world‖ and ―catalyze global 
cooperation to address pressing challenges and future risks.‖2  Why a countermovement? 
Participants of the WSF aim to counter the hegemonic neoliberal economic and political 
framework that presently dominates the direction of policy choices on the world stage. This 
policy direction, as various authors claim, is clearly seen in the tendency to favor economic and 
financial globalization which in turn treats ―the majority of humankind as a discardable surplus‖ 
(Grzybowski, 2006, p. 1). 
 
In different regions of the globe, regional counterparts of the WSF have emerged which 
include the Americas Social Forum, the European Social Forum, the Asian Social Forum, the 
Mediterranean Social Forum and the Southern African Social Forum. Each one derived its (1) 
principles from the WSF Charter of Principles and (2) character from the generally 
heterogeneous mix of participants that come together to unite against a common enemy—
neoliberalism.  
 
In Europe, the struggle takes on a markedly different [additional] dimension which is not 
                                                 
1
 For lack of name for this decade, the BBC News UK suggested the ―Noughties.‖ 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1999/02/99/e-cyclopedia/585224.stm. Bendell and Ellersiek (2009) 
make reference to this decade as the period when the rise of private equity and hedge funds facilitated the 
recognition of the incoherence of basing public policy for corporations on the idea of ―enlightened shareholder 
value‖ which claims to have an interest in both the social and environmental dimensions of business performance. 
2
  See the WEF web page on http://www.weforum.org/en/index.htm.  
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present in other regions—that of the European continent undergoing a process of economic and 
political consolidation and integration (Wahl, 2005).  Risse recently argued that, ―Europe as a 
space of political organization and institutionalization has no clear boundaries‖ (Risse, 2004, p. 
171)  In agreement, Andretta and Doerr assert that ‗external actors‘ images of the European 
Union imply a plurality of meanings and understandings, which means treating the European 
Union as a contested concept, a space of social cultural and political attributes over which a 
symbolic struggle is fought‖ (Andretta & Doerr, 2007, pp. 385-386). The European Social 
Forum (ESF) therefore takes on this dimension in its struggle against the present neoliberal form 
of globalization. 
 
On November 6-10, 2002, the first European Social Forum took place in Florence, Italy, 
and gathered about 60,000 participants.  Like the WSF, the basic idea was to create a space 
wherein different actors could come in contact with each other to network and discuss 
commonalities and differences (Wahl, 2005). Also, like the first WSF, the first ESF had an 
experimental character by offering plenty of opportunities for individual and informal meetings 
which in turn ―created a feeling of identity and was an emotional inspiration, generating energy 
for those who attended‖ (Wahl, 2005, p. 97).  The largest issue tackled was the imminent US led 
war on Iraq and according to police estimates, around 500,000 individuals took part in the anti-
war demonstration. One clear outcome linked to the  Florence ESF was the February 15, 2003 
International Action day against the US led war. 
 
The apparent success of the social forum experiment in Florence can be seen in the 
diverse collection of movements, groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and trade 
unions (TUs) who came together to contest the process of European integration.  One critical 
aspect to note is how activists in the Florence ESF trace back their protest movement in a 
history of struggles which can be seen from the Call of the European Social Movements: 
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―We have come together from the social and citizens‘ movements from all the 
regions of Europe, East and West, North and South. We have come together 
through a long process: the demonstrations of Amsterdam, Seattle, Prague, Nice, 
Gothenburg, Genoa, Brussels, Barcelona, the big mobilizations against neoliberalism 
as well as the general strikes for the defense of social rights and all the mobilizations 
against war, show the will to build another Europe‖ (European Social Movements, 
2002). 
 
Social movements are one of the principal forms through which collectivities declare their 
concerns about a wide range of issues about rights, welfare and well-being (their own as well as 
others‘). Such declarations manifest through the engagement in various types of collective action 
that serve to dramatize grievances and demand that something be done about them. Social 
movements are frequently considered to constitute a so-called ‗extra-parliamentary‘ opposition. 
They demand participatory democracy and social equality to open debate up to alternative 
political programs, tactics and strategies (Bieler & Morton, 2004, p. 98). 
 
The traditional agenda of the study of social movements looked at the relationship of 
social movements and state governments and focused on three factors—―(1) the structure of 
political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement(s); (2) the forms of 
organizations (informal as well as formal), available to insurgents; and, (3) the collective 
processes of interpretation, attribution and social construction that mediate between opportunity 
and action‖ (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, p. viii). Social movement scholars have 
formulated explanations of the emergence and advancement of movements as well as episodes 
of contention by linking them to the characteristics of political opportunities present, the 
existence and quality of mobilizing structures and the framing of issues. 
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Whereas social movements are traditionally analyzed with respect to their relations with 
the state and state agencies, there has been a dramatic resurgence of social movements that 
transcend the state‘s physical and conceptual borders.  During the late 1990‘s there has been an 
upsurge of ―anti-globalization‖ movements against the spread of neoliberal globalization.  These 
movements redefine the conventional notion of citizenship on a number of dimensions and 
varying scales as they oppose the continued contraction of rights, the emasculation of 
democracy, retrenchment of sovereignty brought about by the imposition of a ‗new world order.‘ 
Confronted with the implications of the ‗war on terrorism‘ post 9/11, for example, over 100,000 
people convened in Porto Alegre, Brazil, for the third World Social Forum in January 2003 to 
march against the American led war and ultimately against neoliberalism under the common 
declaration that ‗Another World Is Possible.‘ The first World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil, from January 25 to 30, 2001, was founded with the principles of participation, pluralism 
and respect for diversity, opposition to neoliberal globalization and any ‗one way of thinking.‘ It 
consolidated this new kind of political space by way of demonstrating the possibilities for new 
forms of citizenship practices, or more aptly, post-national citizenship practices within and 
across national boundaries.  This is not to say that such forms of citizenship practices did not 
exist prior to the World Social Forum, rather, by providing an ―…open meeting place for 
reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of 
experiences and interlinking of effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that 
are opposed to neoliberalism, and are committed to building a planetary society directed towards 
relationships among Humankind…,‖3 the World Social Forum has further expanded the space 
for such practices. 
 
                                                 
3  The complete WSF Charter of Principles can be accessed at http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br. 
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Prior to the 1970s, however, meaning work—the struggle over the production of 
mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings—were largely ignored.  Prevalent in the 
social movement literature were broad references to meanings, beliefs, values and the more 
general notion of ideology but taken together, they still remained largely insufficient in analytical 
terms—which means they were either discussed descriptively and statically rather than 
analytically and dynamically; or ―they were dismissed as being largely irrelevant to the 
development of social movements on the whole‖ (Snow & Benford, 1992, pp. 135-136).  Social 
movement scholars during the mid-1980s took interest in the framing concept.  The framing 
perspective does not view social movements as merely carriers of extant ideas and meaning that 
grow automatically out of structural arrangements, unanticipated events or existing ideologies.  
Movements and movement actors are actively viewed as signifying agents dynamically engaged in 
the production and reproduction of meaning for constituents, antagonists, bystanders and 
observers.  They are deeply embroiled, along with the media, local governments and the state in 
what has been referred to as ―the politics of signification‖ (Hall, 1982, p. 64). 
 
Not Seeing Eye to Eye—Global Governance and Social Movement Protest 
Even before the Velvet Revolutions of 1988-1989 and the resurgence of various nationalist 
movements thriving in the former Warsaw Pact countries, scholarship on social movements 
ascribed political status and political significance to these movements. And to the contemporary 
observer of present day politics it would seem preposterous not to do so. Yet, before the 1960s 
social movements were viewed as a form of ‗pre-political‘ behavior serving as warning to those 
in power (Smelser, 1963, p. 21). Social movements were treated as spontaneous, ephemeral and 
expressive rather than enduring and instrumental which reflected the dominant collective 
behavior paradigm during the period.4 
                                                 
4
  The rationalist paradigm holds that any form of collective action is bound to ‗break down‘ due to the free-rider 
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On a more fundamental level, scholars of political science (in particular, of contentious 
politics) observe that global governance is afflicted by a particular flaw—that of a democratic 
deficit.5   While citizens constantly interact with their states and their states‘ agencies and hold 
them accountable through democratic processes, such a relationship is conspicuously absent on 
the level of international organizations despite the fact that a considerable number of 
international policies have direct and immediate impacts on the lives of ordinary citizens on a 
daily basis. Obradovic (1996, pp. 192-193), for example, argues that for more than a decade now, 
the presence of a democratic deficit in the European Union structure has been prominent in 
discussions about European integration. ―The tumultuous process of ratification for the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992–1993 was widely seen as an expression of a certain deficit of 
legitimacy for integration‖. In a more general instance, international organizations have 
formulated policies and erected institutional arrangements to address a wide range of global 
issues such as global epidemics (AH1N1 flu or swine flu, H1N1 flu or bird flu, Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome, to name a few), global terrorism, nuclear proliferation, liberalization of 
trade.  One glaring observation is that ordinary citizens are, for a large part, excluded from 
participating in the [global] governance of these issues despite the far-reaching and immediate 
impact on their lives. 
 
At the international level, contemporary social, political, economic and financial relations 
are being transformed by the processes of globalization at an ever increasing pace.  On the social 
level, we are witnesses to the deluge of migration from the global South to the global North in 
                                                                                                                                                        
problem in the field of Economics. See Olson (1971), Smelser (1963) or Samuelson (1954) for rigorous proof. 
5
  According to the European Commission‘s Europa Glossary the concept of Democratic Deficit is ―a concept 
invoked  principally in the argument that the European Union and its various bodies suffer from a lack of 
democracy and seem inaccessible to the ordinary citizen because their method of operating is so complex. The view 
is that the Community institutional set-up is dominated by an institution combining legislative and government 
powers (the Council of the European Union) and an institution that lacks democratic legitimacy (the European 
Commission).‖ See the Europa Glossary at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/.   
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search of better opportunities.  Both legal and illegal immigration have far-reaching implications 
for the directions of both origin and host countries‘ choice of socio-political and economic 
policies.   
 
On the political level, statesmen are beginning to realize that the Westphalian system, 
which forms the bedrock of today‘s international regime, is time and again found wanting in 
terms of its ability to confront and adequately address contemporary transnational issues of 
environmental degradation, migration, terrorism and energy security, to name a few.  This ‗post-
Westphalian‘ situation is characterized, on one hand, by the emergence of non-state actors that, 
in addition to states, are instruments as well as sources of international regulations. On the other 
hand, the increasing magnitude and complexity of transborder socio-political, economic and 
ecological questions that are in a sense ‗borderless‘ highlight need for extra-state coordination. 
States continue to be important actors in the international arena, albeit in a comparatively and 
significantly reduced capacity.  
 
On the economic level, investment capital is considered an important driver of economic 
growth.  This realization led to the institutionalization of the WEF whose members are the top 
profit earners in their industries—typically enterprises with more than 5 billion dollars in 
turnover.6  However, with the very nature and purpose of capital as profit-seeking coupled with 
its ability to move across borders, states courting capital tend to (re)align their policies to the 
interests of mobile capital. In many instances, notably in countries that lack effectively 
functioning institutions to serve as checks, environmental, labor and safety standards as well as 
aboriginal rights are compromised or at times utterly disregarded in pursuit of the greater 
                                                 
6
  In addition, these enterprises (1) rank among the top companies in their industry and/or countries; and, (2) play 
a leading role in shaping the future of their industry and/or region. 
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economic welfare of society using the principle of eminent domain.7 
 
On the financial level, national financial markets are becoming more enmeshed with each 
other in the global financial market further highlighting the interconnectedness of financial 
markets. Moreover, progressively sophisticated technologies have exponentially increased the 
velocity of global financial transactions such that one minor perturbation at any level of the 
interconnections would have significant effects on the rest of the system. Recent examples 
include the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the present global financial/economic crisis. Both of 
which snowballed from a small glitch in the financial system. The Association pour la Taxation 
des Transactions pour l‘Aide aux Citoyens (ATTAC), France holds that liberalized finance has 
entailed increased inequality and instability on a world scale (ATTAC France, 2003). Looking at 
the numbers, 80 percent of international financial flows are concentrated in about twenty 
countries which make up only 22 percent of the world‘s population.  
 
Fuelling contemporary [transnational] activism is the reality [or perception] that the present 
direction of globalization and economic liberalism, gaps in terms of wealth, income and power 
and myriad other aspects of human development have widened excessively between social 
groups within countries as well as between countries of the global North and global South.  Over 
the years international development circles have increasingly reached a consensus that this 
inequality is destructive, it diminishes prospects for growth, it has negative effects on efforts at 
poverty reduction and effective governance. For instance, as the recognition that a significant 
number of countries ‗can not‘ reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, 
governments and international organizations have focused on the social and political barriers to 
achieving the MDGs as it is there barriers that entrench and exacerbate the unequal access to the 
                                                 
7
  This principle refers to the inherent power of the state to expropriate or seize a citizen‘s private property with 
due compensation even without the owner‘s consent. The most common usage of this principle normally involves 
the provision of public infrastructure that would benefit the greater majority (e.g dams, highways, etc.). 
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resources of society and the distribution of economic and political power within and across 
countries (Watkins, 2007).  
 
Two arguments are advanced to argue why this persistent inequality matters and why 
international development policies should directly address it. First is the intrinsic argument which 
is rooted in the concepts of social justice and morality. The persistence and interconnectedness 
of the different aspects of these inequalities imply that some groups have consistently inferior 
opportunities—economic, social and political—than their fellow citizens. Though the endeavor 
to define social justice is not an easy task because one would encounter a number of plausible 
definitions, it is still quite possible to extract its essence—equal rights, and opportunities 
regardless of background or procedural justice, as well as equal access to the benefits of society.8 
Such a definition takes cue from Rawls‘ statement of principle in his A Theory of Justice where he 
says that, ―Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override. For this reason, justice denies that the loss of freedom for 
some is made right by the greater good shared by others‖ (Rawls, 1972, pp. 3-4) 
 
The second argument is of an instrumentalist nature and is stated on three levels: (1) with 
imperfect markets inequalities in power and wealth translate into unequal opportunities, leading 
to wasted productive potential and to an inefficient allocation of resources; (2) Economic and 
political inequalities are associated with impaired institutional development; and, (3) reducing 
inequality is seen as a crucial public goal—disparities in health and education, for instance, 
reduce the capabilities of disadvantaged groups from taking part in economic development (The 
World Bank, 2007, pp. 7-9). It is apparent that the second argument directly attacks the present 
neoliberal direction of the policy responses to globalization. 
                                                 
8
  For the purpose of this research, this definition of social justice will be used all throughout. 
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Scope and Outline of the Thesis 
The question that this thesis will address squarely is whether the framing processes, which 
provide the lens through which issues are viewed, serve to ―civilize‖ transnational governance. 
To provide a workable, yet well-rounded delimitation I will focus on the ESF and its slogan, 
‗Another Europe is Possible.‘ Right from the outset the ESF‘s tag line is blunt and 
straightforward—that a capitalist driven globalization, ‗a-la top-down globalization,‘ is not the 
way to go, as Appadurai aptly summarizes, it ―…is demonstrably creating inequalities both 
within and across societies…‖ (Appadurai, 2000, p. 2). The slogan of the ESF itself derives 
directly from the World Social Forum‘s—‗Another World is Possible.‘ 
 
Does participation in the political space created by the Forums ‗civilize‘ globalization and 
democratize global governance? In terms of consolidating interests and creating reference 
frames, the (specific) thesis question may be formulated thus: As an arena for public contestation 
of existing [neoliberal] institutions and [neoliberal] institutional arrangements, does the European 
Social Forum enable a ‗just‘ form of regionalization? 
 
First, the thesis will argue that the pluralistic nature of the political space provided and 
promoted by the ESF is an attractive avenue for social groupings with diverging interests and, at 
times conflicting interests, to act as: (1) transmitters by bringing their grievances and proposals to 
the public space for public scrutiny; and, (2) as recipients of other groups‘ grievances and 
proposals. The process, in essence, follows the form of a dialectic with multiple stakeholders and 
multiple perspectives but all falling on one side of the globalization debate.  
 
The thesis takes a critical perspective on European Union (EU) politics and integration by 
viewing the integration project as a post-national endeavor which calls for a deconstruction of 
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11 
the traditional nation-centered concepts of citizenship, political participation and social 
contention.  Contemporary scholarship on social contention reflects this process. Beginning with 
social movements contesting state encroachment into the private space, to social movements 
pushing for greater welfare policies, to identity-related social mobilization in the form of new 
social movements (yet still within the confines of the nation state), to the [seemingly] global 
struggle against the encroachment of neoliberal principles and policies as well as the promotion 
of a higher degree of participatory democracy in transnational decision-making. 
 
Second, the thesis will argue that participation in the forums is not only made manifest by 
physical mobilization. Rather, and more importantly, the progression from the realm of physical 
mobilization to the realm of ideas and discourse allows for the creation of an epistemic 
community which continuously and increasingly problematizes existing forms of globalization. It 
is this community of shared knowledge and expertise which lends more credence to the 
advocacies of different social movements as well as allows particular movements to adapt and 
innovate on the technological and organizational efficacy of other movements. 
 
Lastly, the thesis will argue that the European Social Forum (and the Forums, in general) 
as an avenue for networking and coordination of ‗repertoires of contention‘ as well as 
knowledge-transfer between and among social movement organizations (SMOs) and civil society 
organizations (CSOs) across countries results in coordinated and calibrated responses to 
transnational public policies—which individual states themselves are powerless to counteract—
and transnational private interests—in the face of which, states are held ‗hostage‘ by mobile 
capital. This detail is effectively captured by the activism-policy nexus. In the short-term, we may 
observe an increase in the public‘s consciousness on the issue. In the medium-term, we may 
observe the modification of existing institutional and policy arrangements which are seen as 
propagating the existing [undesirable] structures. 
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Despite the apparent importance of dealing with the notion of collective identity and the 
formation of such within and among movement mobilization, this research will choose not to 
deal with this topic exhaustively.  It is, however, functional to state that the use of the collective 
identity concept in relation to social movement analysis was initially an alternative to the 
structural limitations of the political opportunity framework and resource mobilization theory. 
Polletta and Jasper (2001) observe that the concept, as it was used, has been treated as an 
alternative to structurally given interests in accounting for the claims on behalf of which people 
mobilize, an alternative to selective incentives in understanding why people choose to mobilize 
and participate, an alternative to instrumental rationality in explaining the tactical choices activists 
make, and an alternative to institutional reforms in assessing a movement‘s impacts. Although 
many scholars who have researched the framing processes perspective have also suggested its 
instrumental nature for the formation of collective identity, such a relationship will not be 
touched by this thesis and will be left out altogether.  The author, however, acknowledges the 
significance of the concept and will make use of it in presenting the section on the creation of 
epistemic communities. 
 
The research locates itself in the realm of ‗contentious politics‘ and takes on the three 
components of the classic agenda of the social movement literature and looks at their relevance 
with regard to efforts in explaining transnational episodes of contention.  The end in mind for 
this research would be to argue that the framing processes surrounding the issues that social 
movements advance, though not perfect, substantially serve to ‗civilize‘ transnational governance 
(in this case, regional governance).  
 
The overarching theme of the research reflects Karl Polanyi‘s concept of ‗double 
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movement‘ and positions contemporary State-Business9-Civil Society Organization dynamics 
under this lens for analysis. In proceeding with the research, Chapter 1 lays the groundwork by 
taking on the view of critical scholars that politics is power and that political science involves the 
study of the processes and consequences of the manner in which power is acquired, distributed 
and exercised (Hay, 2002) and locates the analysis within the literature on regional integration. 
Consequently, it presents the contributions of different critical perspectives to the study of 
European Union politics.  Chapter 2 scrutinizes the traditional social movement agenda under 
the backdrop of the ESF as the regional counterpart of the World Social Forum (WSF).  In 
particular, the chapter focuses on the general thread that European social movements take when 
framing relevant issues.10 Chapter 3 explores the notion of political power and positions it within 
State-Business-CSO relationships under a neoliberal paradigm of globalization. It further looks 
into the emergence of epistemic communities on the global stage and how it leads to the 
production of knowledge which not only feeds into reflexive state policies but also contentious 
politics at every level of political activity—local, national, transnational, global.  Chapter 4 
features the case of the European Social Forum‘s initiatives to raise the consciousness of issues 
up to a European level. This chapter further looks at the ESF as a prospective Pan-European 
public sphere. Finally, chapter 5 applies the notion of an activism-policy nexus to contentious 
politics and reflexive government policies. The chapter concludes firstly, by accepting the general 
perception of a ‗movement of movements‘ embodied by the social forums; secondly, by 
contending that these forums open up political space for greater democratic contestation. 
                                                 
9
  While surveying the literature on ‗transnational contentious politics‘ one immediately notices the usage of the 
terms ‗corporation‘ and ‗business‘ to mean essentially the same thing—the profit-driven private sector. The marginal 
difference is that the term ‗corporation/corporate‘ is used to denote a legal entity engaged in profit generating 
activities in the economy  while the term ‗business‘ is used as a sociological moniker for the profit-driven sector. As 
they stand, both terms will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
10
  Much of the recent analyses tend to converge around the issue of policy and institutional reform related to 
development aid, debt relief, trade policy, international taxation and corporate accountability. 
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1. Framework 
The WSF is inspired by the slogan ‗Another World is Possible,‘ which expresses a need to 
construct alternatives from out of the resistance to neoliberal globalization and neoliberalism in 
general.  Scholars hold that the social forums embody the resurgence of social democracy in and 
around Europe [and the globe] as a direct consequence of the broken promises of neoliberal 
structural adjustment policies.  
 
This section surveys the theoretical underpinnings of popular contention in the social 
forums starting with the traditional Left-Right first and second ways giving credence to the 
emergence of a ‗third way‘—a concept originating from writers of the Left who intended to keep 
the objective of socialism salient in the face of increasing internationalization and globalization.  
The third way later on received criticism for seemingly facilitating the rise to hegemony of the 
neoliberal paradigm of the right and in so doing, failed to be a ‗center‘ compromise between 
social democratic principles of the left and rationalist neoliberal economics principles of the 
right.  Proceeding from this, the section also presents the significant contributions of critical 
perspectives in investigating the myriad issues surrounding European Integration and European 
Union politics. 
 
1.1. The Social Democratic Left and the Third Way 
By the mid-1980s, the traditional social democratic left in Europe was unsure of its future. 
The emergence of a growing number of civil groups and social movements as early as the 1960s 
became a clear sign that the socialist project ―could no longer be grouped around the traditional 
paternalism of post-war social democracy‖ (Worth, 2007, p. 93).  The left suffered from an 
internal resistance to change and was ultimately undermined by the reorientation of states toward 
neoliberal economics and the escalating internationalization of state relationships.  Perhaps this 
decline is best demonstrated by the failure of the French Socialist Party to ratify its own agenda 
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while holding office in the 1980s.  In acknowledging the reality of the new dynamics brought 
about by ‗globalization‘ and in efforts to restate the inherent objectives of the socialist project in 
order that they remain relevant, the Left emphasized the new visions of social renewal.  Such a 
vision was crystallized by an attempt to create some level of dialogue between left-wing parties 
across Europe especially within the France-Germany-UK axis.  It was under this backdrop that 
the concept of the ‗Third Way‘ was brought to existence.  ―The third way was the linchpin of the 
center-left in Europe with Schroeder and Jospin creating a united front with Tony Blair across 
the EU‖  (Worth, 2007, p. 94). 
 
By re-articulating the principles and objectives of the political Left as normative 
instruments to engage globalization and benefit from it instead of simply directly opposing it, the 
Left gained a strong platform. Although, this gave an impression that the Left accepted the idea 
of the inevitability of globalization.  On the other hand, the ensuing rhetoric and consequent 
policies significantly moved away from the conceptual objectives associated with socialism and 
social democracy.  Rather, they gravitated towards a framework of action that favored a model of 
inclusion/exclusion and which proposed engagement with global capitalism as opposed to 
‗challenging it‘ (Beck, 1997; Giddens, 1994).  In his book Beyond Left and Right, Giddens‘ critique 
of historical materialism goes as far as arguing for a dismantling of social democracy inspired by 
Keynesian economics to give way for a centrist approach to politics that could realize the 
objectives of socialism far more realistically (Giddens, 1994).  Following on this theme, Beck in 
the 1990s called for a ‗third way‘ in looking at political society. In the wake of the transformation 
of modernity, according to Beck, the left and right political order as the ideological origins of the 
first and second ‗ways‘ needed to change (Beck, 1997).  Beck‘s radical centralism was a call to 
move out from the traditional cul de sac of Left and Right politics to be better able to interact 
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with the nature of ‗reflexive modernity.‘11 For both Beck and Giddens, the third way has 
escalated from a concept that was initially supposed to reconstitute the objectives of socialism 
and keep them relevant in the wake of increasing internationalization to a concept that moves 
beyond re-engagement with socialism.  On one level, Beck holds that post-Keynesian social 
democratic ‗paternalism ended with the ideological constraints of the cold war and since 
socialism provided the central critique in this period, it ―accompanies the Left-Right dichotomy 
to the historical dustbin in both theory and practice‖ (Beck, 1997, p. 150).  Still on another level, 
he holds that the shape of critique embodied by Marxism may have ―captivated the critical 
intelligentsia for a century‖ (Beck, 1997, p. 176) but is now clearly inapplicable.  For Giddens 
both the neoliberal right and socialist left ultimately failed to come to grips with the social 
reproduction of capitalism and he outlines a ‗radical program‘ of new social democracy in pursuit 
of widening markets for those currently excluded as well as public-private partnerships (Worth, 
2007, p. 96). 
 
In the Gramscian sense, Giddens and Beck‘s work seemingly aimed to consolidate a 
hegemonic position through societal pacification.  ―Growing skepticism in France and Germany 
forced many center-leftists in Europe to abandon the rhetoric behind the third way‖ (Worth, 
2007, p. 97).  This contributed to the systematic decline of the third way even before the 
rejection of the Socialists in France and the demise of the SPD in Germany.  Moreover, as a 
result of successive EU enlargements, the third way became less effective as a political strategy 
                                                 
11
  Reflexive modernity is Giddens‘ theory of the uniqueness of modernity. He draws a distinction between 
traditional and modern social formations along two dimensions. First, he notes, the modern is more dynamic and it 
draws its dynamism from three distinct processes: (1) the separation of time and space or ‗space-time distanciation;‘ 
(2) the ‗disembedding‘ mechanism of modern culture; and, modernity‘s reflexive character. The second feature is the 
existence of modern institutions: the nation state, modern political systems, mechanized and technological 
production, wage labor, commodification and urbanization.  For Giddens, ‗postmodernism,‘ ‗post industrial society,‘ 
the globalization of communications technology and the ‗new world order‘ are indices of a ‗second modernity‘ or 
‗reflexive modernity.‘  This is where the reflexive characteristic of modernity effectively liquidates the non-reflexive 
bonds of tradition. See Giddens (1990, 1991, 1992). 
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―since western-European social democrats were not able to coordinate the core ideas behind the 
third way with those from a different historical trajectory‖ (Worth, 2007, p. 97). 
 
1.2. Contribution of Critical Perspectives to the Study of European Union Politics 
In the face of the declining fascination for the third way, critical scholars sought to break 
through the boundaries of traditional political science by questioning the fundamental 
assumptions about political systems, institutions, economic rationalities and methodologies 
which were all rooted in the interest of their forerunners in analyzing the dynamics of the United 
State political system.12  Over and above this impetus, critical scholars situate their work within a 
shared commitment to uncovering the preconceptions of historical reality and the nature and 
origins of knowledge as well share in the desire to change politics.  In this particular regard, 
critical perspectives of European Union politics, although highly differentiated, are aligned with a 
common commitment to the ‗emancipation of humans‘—the liberation of  humans ―from the 
negative consequences of modernity‖ (Manners, 2006, p. 78). This section sets out to survey the 
region of the literature that provides critical perspectives to the study of European Union 




Historical materialist theories on European Union politics grew out of Marx‘s work, 
despite their now apparent salience, they were largely ignored by traditional integration theory 
prior to the end of the Cold War (Smith, S., 2004).  In the course of the Cold War, very few 
scholars investigated European integration under the lens of Marxist perspectives. These scholars 
included Mandel and Rossdale (1970), Galtung (1973, 1980) and Holland (1980). They 
                                                 
12
  See Manners (2003a) and Smith, S. (2004) for a more comprehensive treatment of the subject. 
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maintained the critique of the ‗ahistorical‘ and ‗decontextual‘ nature of contemporary integration 
studies (Manners, 2006) and the seemingly overarching enthusiasm over the larger dynamics of 
capital and its relationship with the elite class. 
 
Two distinct approaches took root in historical materialism—Open Marxism and Neo-
Gramscianism.  Scholars of the historical materialist perspective generally turned their focus 
away from Marxist theorizing of the capitalist state and turned towards transnational human 
social and economic relations.  While both begin with a historical materialist appreciation of the 
capitalist context of social, economic and political relations, they diverge in their treatment of the 
relative primacy of human relations compared to critical economy (Bieler & Morton, 2004). 
 
Open Marxism on one hand necessarily investigated European Union politics in terms of 
class, imperialism, labor commodification and institutional bias.  The distinct works of Bonefeld 
(2001), Burnham (2003), Moss (2005), Smith, H. and Rupert (2002), among others are found at 
the forefront.  Bonefeld and Burnham argued that the politics driving the agenda of the 
monetary union forward can be explained by the desire of capitalist classes in member states for 
greater capital accumulation, or in their terms to ―reinvigorate capital accumulation‖ (Manners, 
2006, p. 79) while depoliticizing fiscal restraint (Bonefeld, 2001; Burnham, 2003).  Moss (2005) 
redirects the emphasis towards the European Union as a neoliberal construct that is subject to 
the competition and rivalries prevailing among the capitalist classes of its member states. Smith, 
H. and Rupert (2002) investigate the different aspects through which the European Union 
treaties commodify labor through the harmonization of laws.  By scrutinizing the apparent 
institutional bias in the European Union policies and decision making processes, Smith, H. 
(2002) went further than most Marxists (Manners, 2006).  The institutional bias manifests itself 
in the overemphasis in the analysis of institutional decision making and in the allowance of 
European Union institutions to control the field of study. 
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Overall, the Open Marxist approach went in the general direction of analyzing the conduct 
of European integration and how it serves the [political] elite of member states. For instance, 
within the single market framework and single currency framework  the dynamics between 
national elites and working classes have radically changed (Manners, 2006).  
 
On the other hand, scholars exemplified by Stephen Gill (2003), Andreas Bieler and Adam 
David Morton (2001) , Bastiaan van Apeldoorn (2002)  and Magnus Ryner (2002), among others, 
take on a transnational historical materialist perspective in analyzing European Union Politics.  
In direct contrast to Open Marxism, Neo-Gramscian accounts focus on the role of ―social 
forces, engendered by the production process, as the most important collective actors‖ (Bieler & 
Morton, 2001, p. 6).  Gill (2003) argued that the economic and monetary union, since the early 
1990s, institutionalized the neoliberal policies and principles and constitutionalized them within 
the European Union and ultimately led to the formation of a neo-Gramscian ‗transnational 
historical block‘ which socially and politically embedded [and continually embeds] neoliberalism.  
Bieler and Morton (2001) are at the forefront of the argument for neo-Gramscian 
counterhegemonic European Union strategies by labor and social movements, specifically within 
the political space provided by the European Social Forum.  It is however important to note 
that, drawing from Gill‘s analysis, Bieler and Morton contend that the impacts of neoliberalism 
on industrial relations have resulted in a greater degree of trade union incorporation into what 
they calls ―competitive corporatism.‖13 Overbeek, van Apeldoorn and Nölke (2007)  argue that 
                                                 
13
  Competitive corporatism‘s primary objective is the regulation and increase of national competitiveness by 
facilitating a restructuring of wage, social and tax policy. These are achieved through various forms of national social 
pacts such as the Dutch Wassenaar Accord or the German ―Alliance for Jobs‖ negotiations.   Three features define 
these pacts: (1) committing the trade unions to wage restraint, wherein wage increases remain below productivity 
increases and wherein an increased segmentation of wages and incomes is accepted; (2) flexibilizing the labor 
markets and the welfare-state institutions and reducing social wage costs; and (3) restructuring the taxation system so 
that taxation gradually shifts towards indirect taxes in particular so that corporate taxation rates are reduced. See 
Ryner and Schulten (2003). 
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the European Union and its processes of integration are embedded in the neoliberal discipline 
shaped by the hegemony of the transatlantic, transnational class as manifest in the role of the 
European Roundtable of Industrialists. In engaging in a neo-Gramscian critique of mainstream 
theories of European integration, van Apeldoorn (2002)  focuses on the ways in which 
neofunctionalist, intergovernmentalist, multi-leveled and liberal constructivist approaches lack a 
―more comprehensive, critical, transnational, historical and materialist theory of European 
integration.‖ 
 
Cafruny and Ryner (2003, pp. vii-viii) raise the question of whether the European Union‘s 
attempts ―to erect a fortress of resistance to the United States-led transnational neoliberal 
hegemony‖ are now in shambles.  The emancipatory colors of the European Social Forum‘s 
slogan ‗Another World is Possible‘ is clearly present in their argumentation.  As neo-Gramscian 
scholars, they argue that the European Union itself needs to become more social-democratic and 
should turn to successful models such as those in the Nordic region for ―inspiration in the 
search for emancipatory alternatives to neoliberalism‖ (Cafruny, 2003, p. 300). 
 
The astonishing growth of the World Social Forum and the European Social Forum since 
2001 gives an indication that political participation is continually being reconfigured by the 
increasing transnationalization of neoliberal politics.  Neo-Gramscian scholars lend credence to 
this by raising critical questions about the role of hegemonic practices in European Union 
politics which effectively challenges traditional integration theories for their decontextualized 
treatment of neoliberalism; and, consequently argue that neoliberalism has already become 
transnationalized, within the European Union in particular (Manners, 2006).  One clear 
manifestation is that the anti-Constitution camps widely shared the European Social Forum 
banner during the referenda rejections in 2005. 
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Critical Theories 
Like historical materialist theories, critical theories (originating from the Frankfurt Institute 
of Social Research) remained discontented from the explanations forwarded by European 
integration theory (Hoskyns, 2004).  The Frankfurt School is the origin of two perspectives of 
critical theory: one based on the work of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno termed ‗critical 
social theory‘; and the other, based on the work of Jürgen Habermas termed ‗deliberative theory.‘ 
 
Unlike historical materialist approaches, critical theories need not contend with the 
intellectual and ideological consequences of the end of communism.  Further, outside the 
European Union, with Habermas (1984, 1989) as one of the primary sources of critical social 
theory, the Frankfurt Critical Theory became widely accepted during the 1980s and 1990s.  
However, it was only during the latter period that the social, political and cultural consequences 
of European integration, globalization and ‗Europeanization‘ were seriously engaged and 
investigated from a critical theory perspective. In the context of European Union politics, both 
deliberative theory and the earlier Frankfurt school critical theory share a common concern for 
understanding and challenging the social production of knowledge; historicizing and 
contextualizing subjectivity; and a commitment to progress and emancipation as the goals of 
research (Warleigh, 2003). Their critical difference lies in the fact that Habermas‘ advocacy of 
‗communicative action‘ in the public sphere is a clear sign that deliberative theorists are more 
interested in the promotion of democracy than the critical questioning of the socio-cultural 
production of human knowledge characteristic of critical social theory (Manners, 2006).  In stark 
contrast to this, scholars drawing their critical social theory from the work of Horkheimer and 
Adorno share an agenda for a progressive and radical critique of modern society (Calhoun, 
1995). 
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Building on Habermas, various scholars such as Dierdre Curtin, Andrew Linklater, 
Christian Joerges, Jürgen Neyer, Kirstin Jacobson, Eric Oddvar Eriksen, Jon Erik Fossum, Helen 
Sjursen and Alex Warleigh sought to understand the development of deliberative processes and 
democracy within a post-national European Union polity.  As it stands, deliberative theorists 
hold that the European Union as a post-national and cosmopolitan democracy wherein the 
concepts of citizenship and democracy are to be developed beyond the traditional Westphalian 
state on the basis of ‗constitutional patriotism‘ (Manners, 2006).  In effect, for Habermas, the 
European Union would ―aim toward a common practice of opinion- and will-formation, 
nourished by the roots of a European civil society and expanded into a European-wide political 
arena‖ (Habermas & Pensky, 2001, p. 100) and ―inspire the Kantian hope for a global domestic 
polity‖ (Habermas & Derrida, 2003, p. 297). 
 
Linklater (1998, p. 85) argues that critical theory [along with discourse ethics] is ―explicitly 
concerned with an emancipatory project with universalist aspirations which transcend national 
frontiers.‖  Furthermore, he argues that this is immanent in the cosmopolitan democracy, 
citizenship and civilizing process of the European Union.  Curtin (1997, p. 58) derives from the 
connection between communicative action, deliberation and civil society in advancing his point 
that ―the European Union post national democracy should be built on deliberation in the public 
sphere.‖  Habermasian deliberative theorists, over the past decade and a half, have shifted the 
theoretical debates beyond arguments over how to best examine European Union politics 
towards how to best realize cosmopolitan and deliberative democracy in the backdrop of a post-
national European Union.  It is in this regard that deliberative theorists are very much concerned 
with questions of democratic deficit, legitimacy and citizenship within the European Union 
member states and European Union institutions (Manners, 2006). 
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Delanty and Campling (1995) and Rumford (2002) bring social theory and political 
sociology to the examination of European Union politics by putting forward the possibility of a 
European identity [in the wake of the Holocaust].14  They contend that the difficulty in studying 
globalization, cosmopolitanism and the European Union lies in the pervasive view which is 
rooted in the nation-state paradigm.  Calhoun‘s critical approach to the study of European 
Union politics emphasizes the politics of identity, democratic integration and the public sphere.  
He argues that it is vital to ―build institutions that encourage and protect multiple, discontinuous, 
sometimes conflicting public spaces and modes of public engagement rather than attempt to 
nurture or impose some unified European culture‖ (Calhoun, 2001, p. 38).  Benhabib (2002, 
2004) looks at the politics of migration and citizenship in the EU from a critical social theory 
perspective.  She investigates the way the ―disaggregation of citizenship in the European Union‖ 
has produced mixed results. In particular, she argues that such a disaggregation is dangerous for 
―large groups of third-country nationals‖ in the face of promises of development for post-
national European Union citizens (Benhabib, 2002, p. 33).  As a valid response, she advocates 
moral universalism rooted in Habermasian discourse ethics which involves the recognition of the 
rights of all to speech and participation in moral conversations. For her, cosmopolitanism 
necessarily involves ―multiple iterations of cosmopolitan norms‖ between layers of international 
law and democratic legislatures (Benhabib, 2004, pp. 176-177). 
 
Kauppi‘s (2005, p. 22) structural constructivist approach to European Union politics 
primarily focuses on the European Parliament as ―a revolutionary site which contributes to 
changing the structural features of member state political fields by introducing new institutions 
and practices.‖ In order to understand the [dislocating] effect of European integration, Kauppi 
(2005, p. 22) argues for an imperative need to develop Bourdieu‘s structural constructivist theory 
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  Adorno and Horkheimer  (1997) posed the same question in Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
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of politics because it ―offers powerful instruments for a critical analysis of political power‖ and 
―remedies some of the weaknesses of most versions of social constructivism, such as their 
diffuse conception of power and ideational notion of culture. The structural constructivist theory 
of European integration therefore moves towards examining the European Union as a multi-
level and polycentric evolving field (Manners, 2006). 
 
The questions raised by critical social theorists in their study of European Union politics 
are by no means new or novel in relation with the integration process.  Questions of identity, 
culture, imperialisms and ethnicity have always been present right from the beginning of the 
European integration process.  Critical social theorists, however, problematize these questions in 




Postmodern science (Lyotard, 1984) involves perspectives aimed at ―producing not the 
known but the unknown‖ in order to ―wage a war on the totality of metanarratives‖ (Manners, 
2003b, pp. 254-255).  Running along the lines of historical materialism and critical theory, 
postmodern sciences consciously avoided traditional integration theory which has been seen as 
mainly concerned with ‗producing the known‘ in the form of metanarratives (or all-
encompassing stories) about European Union politics.  Postmodern scientific inquiries have 
increasingly contributed to the study of European Union politics since the 1990s and through 
the contribution of scholars such as Jacques Derrida and Julia Kristeva, as well as later 
contributions drawing from methods from Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault and Jacques 
Derrida (Manners, 2006, p. 83). 
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Scholars such as Ian Ward and Peter van Ham have led the way in analyzing the 
postmodern condition of European Union politics.  Ward (1995, p. 532)  argues that the 
―European Union can best be understood as a postmodern text, and perhaps a postmodern 
polity‖ because ―from a political perspective, the European Union apparently continues to defy 
objective determination.‖ Ward further argues that to be able to more fully understand the 
European Union and develop a public philosophy, we need to think beyond sovereignty, 
democracy and constitutionalism toward, citing Derrida‘s words, ―a sense of justice which lies 
‗beyond‘ rather than ‗before‘ the law‖ (Ward, 2001 citing Derrida, 1992). Van Ham attempts to 
investigate questions of governance, democracy and identity from a postmodern perspective and 
perhaps gives the most comprehensive account.  In line with Lyotard‘s definition of the 
postmodern as ‗incredulity toward metanarrative,‘ van Ham‘s multifaceted work does not 
attempt to ―come to an understanding of the vastness of political life on a European scale‖ (van 
Ham, 2001, p. 22).  In analyzing the European Union‘s postmodern condition, the postmodern 
perspective attempts to understand the consequences of unbundling the concepts of sovereignty, 
territory and governance. The assumptions of the modern state form have to be problematized 
in a global environment characterized by global economic competition, overlapping international 
jurisdiction and radical cultural changes (Manners, 2006). 
 
The approaches based on genealogy, governmentality and discourse were led by scholars 
such as Stefan Elbe, William Walters, Jens Henrik Haahr and Henrik Larsen, all of whom draw 
on the works of Nietzsche and Foucault.  For these approaches, the European Union is a site of 
power relations and it is the location where knowledge and power meet and this meeting has 
consequences for understanding the past, present and future through disciplining, governing and 
discursive practices (Manners, 2006). 
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Elbe (2003, p. 114) holds that Nietzsche provides an alternative perspective from which to 
look over and above the ‗evil‘ of European nationalisms, ―to become good Europeans‖ who 
―would find their meaning in the diverse and enigmatic aspects of existence.‖ As Nietzsche 
(1998, p. 98) argued, ―perspectival seeing is the only kind of seeing there is, perspectival knowing 
the only kind of knowing.‖  Walters and Haahr (2005, pp. 16-17) locate their genealogical 
perspective in Michel Foucault‘s reading and contend that genealogy is the ―excavation of 
singular events in order to understand the construction of the present.‖ Their approach is based 
on Foucauldian ‗governmentality‘ combining discourse analysis with a focus on the history of 
governance (Manners, 2006).  In adopting the perspective of governmentality, they are more able 
to examine European Union politics through the power/knowledge themes of political analysis, 
including but not limited to the forms, rationality and technologies of power (Walters & Haahr, 
2005). 
 
These methods of genealogy and governmentality provide a means of analyzing and 
understanding the power of the EU to shape the idea of Europe, European identity, the market, 
internal affairs, and foreign affairs. By engaging a historical approach it becomes possible to 
understand how European Union politics assumed the governmental attitude of technocratic 
coordination.  Moreover, the analysis of discursive constructions of regulation and policy allows 
for the sense-making in the different aspects of European integration.  Power politics manifests 
itself not in the ability to shape the agenda nor in the ability to sway the negotiation, but in the 
ability to shape preferences themselves (Manners, 2006). 
 
European Union scholars concerned with the construction and structure of ‗truth‘, ‗self‘ 
and ‗others‘ follow the poststructuralist tradition and are informed by the work of Foucault and 
Derrida.  These scholars share a commitment to deconstructing narratives within Europe and the 
European Union for the purpose of revealing and understanding the alternative truths and 
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possibilities (Manners, 2006).  Notably, Derrida‘s work emphasizes the extent to which 
European integration is a ‗journey towards the other‘ (Derrida, 1992).  For him, such a journey is 
―necessary to make ourselves the guardians of an idea of Europe, of a difference of Europe, but 
of a Europe that consists precisely in not closing itself off in its own identity and advancing itself 
in an exemplary way toward what is not… to advance itself as a heading for the universal essence 
of humanity‖ (Derrida, 1992, p. 29). Kristeva (1982, 1991) and Kristeva and Roudiez (1993)  
advance a psychoanalytic approach based on poststructuralism and contends that the other is 
always part of the self.  Her work focuses on the ―creation of the self as an internal psychological 
process‖ and in which the ―other exists in our minds through imagination even when he or she is 
not physically present (Kristeva, 1982, p. 155). Her view of European integration is that it is a 
part of a cosmopolitan ethic that recognizes the strangers to ourselves and the ‗othering practice‘ 
of nationalism (Manners, 2006). Diez‘s (1997) contribution towards the understanding of the 
integration discourse is his investigations into the role of language in constructing European 
Union politics in using Foucault and Derrida to deconstruct and ‗open up space‘ for alternative 
constructions of Europe, a contribution which clearly resonates with the slogan of the World 
Social Forum and European Social Forum. 
 
In the process of using deconstruction to analyze and understand European Union 
politics, poststructuralists are seeking to denaturalize stories about European integration which 
are taken at face value, or as common sense. In this search for emancipation, the questions of 
where the European Union is headed, what it actually is, the how and where questions become 
more and more problematized.  Post-structural scholars advocate the alternative possibilities of 
European Union politics in terms of non-teleological political cultures, reconciliation with 
otherness, reflexive foreign policy and the securitization of migration in the European Union 
(Manners, 2006). 
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Feminist Perspectives 
The construction of difference is perpetually present in the landscape of European Union 
politics and feminist perspectives address the most perennial of these differences—that of 
gender differences.  The feminist literature highlights the pervasiveness of power relations 
embedded in social institutions such as European political science and European Union 
institutions themselves as well as how these structures propagate these differences.  Two of the 
most pronounced feminist perspectives stem from the Wollstonecraft dilemma within feminist 
perspectives—referring to the choice of whether feminists should seek equal rights or recognize 
and support difference.  European Union feminist scholarship has generally taken three 
directions to achieve gender equality: equal treatment; positive discrimination and gender 
mainstreaming (Rees, 1998). 
 
The first critical point of the European Union feminist scholarship was Article 119 of the 
Treaty of Rome which states ‗that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work‘ 
(Rees, 1998). Much later, after the activism in Belgium on behalf of Gabrielle Defrenne, the 
direct effect of the equal pay principle was established in 1976 (Hoskyns, 2004).  Building on this 
success, further feminist scholarship focused on equal treatment then later on pay, employment, 
social security, self-employment, pregnancy and parenthood (Hoskyns, 2004). Feminist 
perspectives on European Union politics have continually raised the most important questions 
about the European Union polity as a democratic, participatory and just polity. 
 
2. The Classic Social Movement Agenda 
In the mid-1990s, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) identified three overarching sets of 
explanatory factors among which students and scholars of social movements and revolutions 
were increasingly gaining consensus: 
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i. the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the 
movements;  
ii. organizations (informal as well as formal), available to insurgents; and  
iii. the collective processes of interpretation, attribution and social construction 
that mediate between opportunity and action. 
 
Whereas this research focuses on the third factor, it will still be worthwhile to go through a 
discussion of the first two factors: political opportunities and mobilizing structures. Douglas 
McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001), three of the most prominent social movement 
scholars, however, have added a fourth aspect and suggest that the literature of social 
movements since the 1960s has focused on four aspects: (1) political opportunities; (2) 
mobilizing structures; (3) collective action frames; and (4) repertoires of contention—that is, the 
array of means by which participants in contentious political settings make collective claims 
(Giugni, Bandler, & Eggert, 2006).  Different social movement scholars refer to these four 
aspects as mediating factors between social change—which is the ultimate origin of 
contention—and contentious interaction—which is the dependent variable.  Moreover, scholars 
stress that the classic social movement agenda for analyzing and explaining social contention 
stemmed from questions that scholars ask to link these various aspects together (McAdam, 
Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001): 
 
i. How does social change influence: (1) the opportunity available to potential 
political agents; (2) the mobilizing structures that promote communication, 
coordination, commitment and resource availability within and among 
potential agents; and, (3) the framing processes that produce communal 
definitions of events.  
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ii. How do mobilizing structures shape political opportunity and to what degree 
is the relationship causal? What are its effects to framing processes and 
contentious interaction?  
iii. How do opportunity, mobilizing structures and framing processes structure 
the repertoires of contention?  
iv. How do available repertoires mediate relations between opportunity and 
contentious interaction, on one hand, and between framing processes and 
contentious interaction on the other?  
 
Although the synthesis presented by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly is increasingly receiving 
attacks,15 most analyses of social movements and social contention remained rooted to one or 
more of these aspects. 
 
2.1. Political Opportunities 
Tarrow (Tarrow, 1994, p. 54) defines political opportunities as: 
―…consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent or national signals to 
social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their 
internal resources for social movements.‖ 
 
They refer to various aspects of the political system that affect the success of groups to 
mobilize effectively. Koopmans (1999, p. 97), on the other hand, describes political opportunities 
as ―options for collective action with chances and risks attached to them, which depend on 
factors outside the mobilizing group.‖  Studies which employ this framework tend to focus on 
the dynamics and processes of three clusters of variables that may influence the outcome of 
                                                 
15
  See Goodwin and Jasper (2003) for a discussion of the proponents and the critics.  
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particular social movement mobilization (Tadem, 2009). First, these studies ―tend to look at 
political opportunity structures which include opening up access to power, shifts in ruling 
alignments brought about by cleavages within and among elites and the availability of influential 
allies‖ (Tarrow, 1994, p. 18).  Second, changes in political opportunity structures are also 
investigated as these may either encourage or discourage mobilization and affect when and how 
contentions lead to reforms (Tadem, 2009). Further, the political opportunity framework seeks 
to explain ―why movements take on different trajectories because of the difference of political 
opportunity structures across contexts over time‖ (Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002, p. xi).  
However, political opportunities are not only ―perceived and taken advantage of by social 
movements, they are also created‖ (Khagram, Riker, & Sikkink, 2002, p. 17).  
 
Another important aspect to note with political opportunities is that they also need to be 
understood as perceived opportunities rather than simple objective realities that have causal 
relationships with social movements (Tadem, 2009).  Social movement participants act on 
different interpretations of their perceptions of the presence or absence of political opportunities 
as well as whether these opportunities open up options of present constraints.  Hilhorst (2003) 
emphasizes that in the emergence, sustainability or even [structural] collapse of social 
movements, it is important to understand the collective action frames used by movement 
participants and the processes through which these frames evolve and translate or fail to 
translate into collective action.  Therefore, analyzing the discourses that are woven into social 
contention becomes an integral element of any investigation of mobilizations. 
 
2.2. Mobilizing Structures 
Mobilizing structures refer to ―those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, 
through which people mobilize and engage in collective action‖ (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 
1996, p. 3). This framework was introduced initially during the 1960s as resource mobilization 
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theory as a criticism of the then dominant collective behavior paradigms which tended to view 
social movements as a reaction to feelings of deprivation and grievances from social stress and 
change.  Resource mobilization theorists have continually stressed the role of organization and 
the capacity of aggrieved groups to gather and mobilize various kinds of resources (Giugni, 
Bandler, & Eggert, 2006). 
 
Social movement scholars distinguish between two basic types of mobilizing structures: (1) 
formal organizations; and, (2) informal networks.  The Association pour la Taxation des 
Transactions pour l‘Aide aux Citoyens (ATTAC) movement exemplifies the first type while the 
second type can be seen in the web of interpersonal contacts and exchanges among movement 
activists and participants exemplified by the different national, regional and world forums 
(Giugni, Bandler, & Eggert, 2006).  Both types represent vital resources for any form of 
collective action and della Porta and Diani (1999, p. 20) define mobilizing structures as ―informal 
networks based on shared beliefs and solidarity which mobilize about conflictual issues through 
the frequent use of various forms of protest.‖ 
 
Both political opportunity structures and mobilizing structures impact on ―the mode of 
collective action social movement actors engage in, the manner in which they frame issues for 
public consumption and how the objectives they address emerge from the intersection of 
structures and meanings‖ (Whittier, 2002, p. 290).  
 
2.3. Framing Processes 
The third main component of the classic social movement agenda which captures cultural 
dimensions of social movements is the framing process.  Of the three aspects of the classic 
agenda, this is the most loosely defined as it has been used with such a varied array of meanings 
as to virtually become synonymous with culture (Giugni, Bandler, & Eggert, 2006).  The 
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analytical application to sociology of the concept and process of framing is due to the influence 
of Goffman‘s (1975) book on the same topic.  
 
Historically, not until the mid-1980s did the literature on social movements pay attention 
to the analytic utility of framing processes, and in general, the construction of meaning in 
contentious politics.  This is largely due to the fact that much of the post-war social movement 
theorizing was influenced by Marxist theory and as such, it had often assumed that collective 
action came out of material interests and that collective actors were economic classes (Williams, 
2004).  For many scholars, social movements meant the labor-socialist movement. 
 
With the emergence of New Social Movements which are not mainly motivated by 
economic interests and in which movement participants are not essentially out for material gain, 
the cultural component of social movement theory became more visible and could no longer be 
ignored. New social movements16 were often thought to be moral crusades and being such a new 
phenomenon, it needed to be theorized distinctly for the historical moment in which they 
occurred (Williams, 2004).  The cultural component had to do with the (1) content of the 
movement ideology, (2) the concerns motivating activists, and (3) the arena in which collective 
action was focused (Williams, 2004). Focusing on culture as an arena of action and cultural 
change as a consequence of movement efforts added an important aspect to structural approach 
perspectives such as political opportunities and resource mobilization.  Poletta and Jasper (2001) 
argue that new social movement theorists‘ work on ‗collective identity‘ and its role in movement 
emergence was an important step forward.  It provided a path away from the rational actor 
theory of structuralist perspectives—in particular, the ‗free-rider‘ problem that pervaded the 
study of collective action during the period. 
                                                 
16
  For new social movements, the arena lies in cultural understandings, norms and identities rather than material 
interests and economic distribution. 
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This ‗cultural turn‘ in social movement theorizing has since been geared towards ―bringing 
meaning back in‖ and it has focused on the movements‘ use of symbols, language, discourse, 
identity and other dimensions of culture to recruit, retain, mobilize and motivate members 
(Williams, 2004).  The apparent cultural turn in social movement theorizing suggests that 
between the late 1960s and mid 1980s scholars in one manner or the other increasingly 
considered the interpretative process as something that cannot be taken for granted in relation to 
social movement analysis (Snow, 2004). 
 
The most widely articulated of these cultural approaches is the framing perspective. 
Building on Goffman‘s (1975) book, Benford (1993), Snow and Benford (2000), Snow (2004), 
Goodwin and Jasper (2003), among others, have presented, elaborated, reviewed and criticized 
the framing perspective. Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford (1986)   joined together the 
growing yet scattered work and empirical observations under the heading frame alignment 
processes.  McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996, p. 6) define framing processes as ―conscious 
strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of 
themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.‖ Snow (2004, p. 384) introduces a 
more comprehensive definition taking into consideration the evolution of the concept since the 
mid 1990s: ―Framing processes focus attention on the signifying work or meaning construction 
of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.‖ Snow‘s definition 
and treatment of the concept provides a conceptual overview of the framing perspective by 
focusing on collective action frames and the way in which they are similar to or different from 
everyday interpretative frames.  He argues that the framing perspective is rooted in the symbolic 
interactionist and constructivist tenet that meanings do not automatically or naturally attach 
themselves to objects, events or experiences we encounter, but often arise through interactively 
based interpretative processes (Snow, Soule, & Kreisi, 2004).  In keeping with this, the evolution 
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of the framing perspective in the literature has consistently focused on the signifying work or 
meaning construction engaged in by social-movement activists, participants, and other actors 
(e.g. antagonists, elites, media, countermovements, etc.) relevant to the interests of social 
movements and the challenges they mount (Snow, 2004). 
 
Williams argues that the most important contribution of the framing perspective to the 
literature on social movements is the fact that it calls attention to and explicitly theorizes the 
symbolic and meaning work done by movement activists ―as they articulate grievances, generate 
consensus on the importance and forms of collective action to be pursued, and present 
rationales for their actions and proposed solutions to adherents, bystanders and antagonists‖ 
(Williams, 2004, p. 93). 
 
Whereas prior inquiries into social movements dynamics take for granted the ideas and 
beliefs carried by social movements themselves, the framing perspective, in contrast, 
problematizes this basic assumption.  It portrays movements as signifying agents engaged in the 
production and maintenance of meanings (Snow, 2004).  Hall (1982, p. 56) calls this the politics 
of signification because, he contends, ―that just like local governments, the state, representatives 
of various authority structures, the media, and interested publics,‖ social movements make and 
remake meaning.  Social movements ―frame or assign meaning to and interpret relevant events 
and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to 
garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists‖ (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). The 
resultant products are called collective action frames. 
 
Just like picture frames, collective action frames focus attention by punctuating or 
specifying what in our sensual field is relevant and what is irrelevant.  In relation to the object of 
orientation, it specifies what is ‗inside the frame‘ and what is ‗outside the frame.‘ More 
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importantly, frames function as articulation mechanisms by tying together the various punctuated 
elements of the presented scene so that a particular set of meanings is conveyed to the recipient 
instead of another.  On the flipside, frames may also perform transformative functions in the 
sense of altering the meanings of the objects of attention and their relationship to other objects 
in the scene, as in the transformation of grievances and misfortunes into injustices in the context 
of collective action (Snow, 2004). 
 
In analyzing the overall development of the literature on the concept of framing as applied 
to the analysis of social movements, Snow and Benford (2000) focus on four fundamental areas: 
(1) the conceptualization of collective action frames and the delineation of their characteristic 
features; (2) identification of framing processes relevant to the generation, elaboration and 
diffusion of collective action frames; (3) specification of various socio-cultural contextual factors  
that constrain and facilitate framing processes; and, (4) elaboration of consequences of framing 
processes for other movement processes and outcomes.  
 
Collective Action Frames 
Framing as the process of constructing meaning or signification denotes an active, 
processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention even at the level of reality 
construction—active in the sense that it entails that something is being done and processual in 
the sense of an evolving process (Snow & Benford, 2000). The process involves the participation 
of social movement organizations acting as individual agents in pursuit of their goals. The 
framing process is contentious because it involves ―generation of interpretative frames that may 
not only differ from existing ones but may also challenge them‖ (Snow & Benford, 2000, p. 612). 
The outcome of such a framing activity is what Snow and Benford label as ‗collective action 
frames.‘ 
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For Goffman (1975) frames denote ‗schematas of interpretation‘ that enable individuals to 
―locate, perceive, identify and label‖ (Goffman, 1975, p. 21)occurrences within their life space 
and the world at large.  These frames aid in generating the significance of experiences as well as 
their meaning and as such function to organize experience and guide action (Snow & Benford, 
2000).  Collective action frames serve this interpretative purpose but in ways that are ―intended 
to mobilize adherents, to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists‖ (Snow & 
Benford, 1988, p. 198). It is in this sense that Snow and Benford (2000, p. 614) argue that 
collective action frames are ―action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and 
legitimate the activities and campaigns of social movement organizations.‖ 
 
Collective action frames are characterized by two distinct features: one concerns their 
action-oriented function, or a social movement organization‘s core framing task (Snow & 
Benford, 1988); the second refers to the interactive and discursive processes that attend to these 
core framing tasks and as such are generative of a collective action frame (Gamson, 1991). 
 
Since the very purpose of social movement mobilizations is to seek remedy for or alter 
some problematic situation, it follows that this contention is contingent on the identification of 
the source of causality, blame, and culpable agents. The process of constructing collective action 
frames consists of movement participants (1) negotiating a shared understanding of some 
problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, (2) making attributions as to 
who or what is to be blamed, (3) articulating an alternative set of arrangements, and (4) urging 
others to act in concert to affect change (Snow & Benford, 1988). These aspects are referred to 
respectively as diagnostic framing, or problem identification and attribution, prognostic framing, 
and motivational framing (Snow & Benford, 1988).  In the process of engaging in these framing 
tasks, social movement agents address the problem of  consensus mobilization and  action 
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mobilization (Klandermans & Staggenborg, 2002).  Consensus mobilization assists in the 
formation of agreements and action mobilization fosters action. 
 
On diagnostic framing, Gamson (1991) developed the concept of ‗injustice frames‘—as a 
precursor to collective noncompliance, protest, and/or rebellion, injustice frames are modes of 
interpretation generated and adopted by those who define the actions of an authority as unjust17  
(Snow & Benford, 2000). Numerous studies populate a sub-category of injustice frame studies 
and seek to identify the victims of a particular injustice and consequently amplify that aspect.  
 
The second core framing task, prognostic framing, refers to the formulation and 
articulation of a proposed set of solutions to the problems or issues identified in diagnostic 
framing. Snow and Benford observe that the identification of certain problems and issues in 
diagnostic framing ―tends to constrain the range of possible ‗reasonable‘ solutions and strategies‖ 
that social movement organizations may advocate (Snow & Benford, 2000, p. 616). Klandermans 
and Goslinga (1996) asserted that it is important to bear in mind that prognostic framing occurs 
within a multi-organizational field which consists of various social movement organizations, their 
adversaries, their targets of influence, media and bystanders.  As such, counterframing activities, 
or refutations of the logic or efficacy of solutions advocated by opponents along with rationales 
for the advocates‘ proposed remedies (Benford, 1993), are not uncommon. 
 
The process of generating motivational frames involves a ‗call to arms‘ or a generation of 
the rationale for engaging in the collective action (Snow & Benford, 2000).  Gamson (1991) 
identifies this as the development of the agency component of collective action frames which 
Benford (Benford, 1993, p. 196) isolated into four generic vocabularies which appear in the 
                                                 
17
  Several case studies focus on the development of injustice frames. See Anheier, Neidhart and Vortkamp (1998), 
Čapek (1993) and Klandermans and Goslinga (1996) for examples. 
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course of interaction among social movement participants and non-participants: movement 
activists, rank-and-file supporters, recruits and others.  These are vocabularies of severity (the 
immensity of the danger), urgency (the urgent necessity to achieve the proposed situation), 
efficacy (the power of the new awareness and your role in unfolding the drama, and propriety 
(your awareness is needed to achieve the proposed situation). Such socially constructed 
vocabularies provide adherents with compelling accounts for engaging in collective action and 
for sustaining their participation. 
 
Variability in Collective Action Frames 
Collective action frames also possess variable features. Social movement scholars 
elaborated on the following features: (1) problem identification and direction or locus of 
attribution; (2) interpretative scope and influence; and, (3) degree of resonance. Snow and 
Benford (2000, p. 618) hold that the first feature, that of problem identification and direction of 
attribution, is the most obvious way in which collective action frames vary. This is due to the 
very nature and origin of social movements, as a manner of expressing grievances and manifest 
contention with regard to particular problems or issues affecting a particular collective.  In its 
most fundamental sense, collective action frames vary along this feature because different 
populations or collectives may have been affected by problems in dissimilar manners.  
 
Another feature of collective action frames concerns their variation in scope and influence 
owing to their flexibility/rigidity and inclusivity/exclusivity. Collective action frames vary along 
this dimension in terms of the number and breadth of themes or ideas they incorporate or 
articulate (Snow & Benford, 2000). In many instances, the scope of collective action frames 
associated with most movements is often limited to the interests of a particular group or set of 
related problems. However, some collective actions frames are broad in terms of scope and these 
frames often function as ―a kind of master algorithm that colors and constrains the orientations 
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and activities of other movements‖ (Snow & Benford, 2000, p. 618). Snow and Benford (Snow 
& Benford, 1992, 2000) term these relatively broad and inclusive collective action frames as 
master frames.  In their survey of the literature they argue that only a handful of collective action 
frames are sufficiently broad and inclusive to qualify as master frames.  For example, rights 
frames (Williams, 2004), choice frames (Davies, S., 1999), injustice frames (Carroll & Ratner, 
1996; Gamson, 1991), environmental justice frames (Čapek, 1993), culturally pluralist frames 
(Davies, M. & Ryner, 2006; Davies, S., 1999), oppositional frames, hegemonic frames, and a 
return to democracy frame. 
 
Resonance, as another dimension in which collective action frames vary, acquires its 
salience in the analysis of frame generation and propagation when we consider the question of 
why certain frames ‗resonate‘ while others do not. Resonance in this sense concerns the 
characteristic of collective action frames to be accepted by movement participants and in turn, be 
propagated in their networks. According to Snow and Benford (1988) two sets of factors 
influence a collective action frame‘s degree of resonance: (1) the credibility of the frame; and, (2) 
its relative salience. 
 
On one hand, frame credibility is a function of three factors: (1) frame consistency, (2) 
empirical credibility, and (3) credibility of the frame articulators or claim makers18 (Snow & 
Benford, 2000). A frame‘s consistency is evident in the correspondence of a social movement 
organization‘s beliefs, claims and actions.  Consequently, inconsistency can emerge from 
apparent contradictions between beliefs and claims; as well as in perceived contradictions 
between frames and [tactical] actions (Snow & Benford, 2000).  
 
                                                 
18
  Also see Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford (1986) and Snow, Soule and Kreisi (2004). 
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Further, empirical credibility concerns whether the empirical references of frames afford a 
degree of persuasiveness in that these frames are accepted to be real indicators of the social 
movement organization‘s claims. Gamson (1991) and Williams, R.S. (2004) both contend that 
the more culturally plausible and believable the claimed evidence and the greater the number of 
observed evidences, the more credible the frame is and the broader its appeal. 
 
As with any struggle for meaning, the perceived credibility of the articulators has 
tremendous impact on the persuasiveness of the message.  This is a well established fact in the 
social psychology of communication and the same is also true for collective action frames by 
social movement organizations.  Variables such as social status, expertise and its relevance to the 
issue have been found to have undeniable impact on the persuasiveness of issue articulations.  In 
principle, social psychologists hold, the more relevant the status and/or perceived expertise is to 
the issue being articulated as well as the relevance of the represented organization‘s track record, 
the more plausible and resonant the framings are. 
 
Admittedly, European integration is not only multilevel, it is also symbolic (and 
contestation is consequently present on the level of symbolisms)—the increasingly relevant role 
of ideas as a precondition for the definition of the interests of different sectors. Subsequently, 
the steps and effect of integration are not straightforward consequences of the ‗exogenous‘ 
interests of the [main] actors. Instead, their ‗imagined Europe‘ is seen as exerting substantial 
influence (della Porta & Caiani, 2009, p. 18). 
 
With this in mind, an instrumental analysis of European integration seems decreasingly 
able to sustain the integration process or, at the very least, legitimate such process. The symbolic 
construction of Europe and a European identity become more and more relevant (della Porta & 
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Caiani, 2009).  These two processes need to be advanced side by side to be able to come up with 
a more compelling roadmap for European integration.  
3. Neoliberal Globalization and Its Implications for the Politics of Contention 
―Globalization, understood as a particular, contemporary configuration in the 
relationship between capital and the nation-state is demonstrably creating inequalities 
both within and across societies, spiraling processes of ecological degradation and 
crisis, and unviable relations between finance and manufacturing capital, as well as 
between goods and the wealth required to purchase them‖ (Appadurai, 2000, pp. 15-
16).  
 
Arguably, the world has witnessed globalization in one form or another since the 
beginning of human existence but only recently have we seen an ever increasing speed and 
velocity of international integration owing largely to the rapid turnover of technological 
innovations in the financial and communication sectors. However, the term ―globalization‖ may 
mean different things to different people(s) and to have a substantially meaningful discussion of 
the globalization phenomenon it becomes imperative that we acquire an awareness of the 
conceptual lenses through which different people(s) view globalization. 
 
Scholte (1999, 2005) outlines how contemporary scholars conceptualize globalization: as 
internationalization, liberalization, universalization, westernization/modernization, and 
deterritorialization. Accounts of globalization stressing the aspect of increasing international 
integration and interdependence as well as transborder relations and transactions: flow of capital, 
goods and services; transborder migration; and the expanding integration of communication tend 
to view globalization through the lens of internationalization. Liberalization, on the other hand, 
shifts the spotlight to the move to reduce if not remove barriers to trade and controls on capital 
which in turn would lead to the development of a global economy. The universalization lens 
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offers a different perspective. It highlights the progressive global standardization of experiences, 
cultural norms and tastes, and governance style. The westernization/modernization lens plays up 
the dominance of Western values and institutions in the diffusion of norms and values across the 
globe and often highlights the perception of cultural imperialism and threats to traditional 
‗backward‘ cultures. Lastly, viewing globalization through the lens of deterritorialization 
highlights the decoupling of activities from territorial, often physical, logic and constraints 
(Scholte, 2005).  
 
Moving from an acknowledgement of the different conceptions of globalization one then 
encounters the controversy of identifying its causes and effects. The disagreement revolves 
around the myriad aspects of causes and effects generally lumped together under the concept of 
globalization with each aspect interacting with the rest. Kratochwil (2002, p. 40) suggest that the 
globalization discourse lumps together an assortment of different processes of change, ―each one 
being propelled by its own complex casual chains and interactions‖. Under this light, one must 
not think of globalization as having one cause (Kratochwil, 2002) as the globalization process 
itself is also an amalgamated effect of specific disjoint processes. From this point, some scholars 
suggest that globalization may be conceptualized as ―simultaneous interactive cascades of 
change‖ with each cause of future effects of previous changes at earlier stages (Fuchs, 2007, p. 
112). 
 
Faced with such methodological difficulties in isolating causes from effects, scholars who 
have examined the varied processes of globalization argue that we can identify broad enabling 
structural conditions as driving forces behind globalization (Scholte, 2005).  These structures are: 
(1) technological progress, especially in the areas of communications, data processing and 
transport; (2) economic incentives; and, (3) facilitative regulatory frameworks 
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The technological revolution has tremendously increased the speed and quantity of extra-
territorial transactions. In his book The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of 
Cultural Change, Harvey (1997, pp. 239-240) calls this process ‗time-space compression‘ which 
refers to sub-processes that accelerate the experience of time and reduce the significance of 
distance in a given [historical] moment. In his words, it refers to ―processes that… revolutionize 
the objective qualities of space and time.‖  Paul Virilio (1986, p. 142) uses the term ―dromology‖ 
to refer to the ―science [or logic] of speed‖ and emphasizes its importance when considering the 
structuring of society in relation to warfare and modern media. Further, recent technological 
developments have made possible the creation of material infrastructures locally which allow for 
greater supraterritorial political, economic and social relations (Wriston, 1992). Consequently, 
ideas and values easily diffuse globally and permeate traditional state boundaries. The advent of 
‗digitization‘ radically reduced the significance of physical barriers and formed the basis for the 
speed and quantity of global communications. Collectively, these developments created 
opportunities for the formation of a ‗global consciousness‘ characterized by a growing 
consciousness of events outside our individual sphere of action.  
 
Economic incentives have provided a second enabling condition for globalization.  In 
increasingly open and monetized international markets, the ability to gain profits has proven to 
be a dominant driving force for agents‘ global orientation and desire to extend economic activity 
beyond their immediate physical territory.  To illustrate this point we look at the prevailing 
investment behavior of corporations, transnational corporations in particular. Guided by the 
dictum of ‗maximize profits and minimize costs,‘ these corporations compile their investment 
portfolio in terms of the favorability of the investment climate in certain territories (i.e. political 
stability, infrastructure, level of tax burden, presence of labor unions, etc).  As such, local and 
national governments compete to attract these investments by lowering tax burdens and 
reducing any risks and uncertainties on the part of the companies, often to the detriment of local 
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labor and health standards.  Looking at the European Union enlargement to illustrate this point, 
one of the major issues surrounding the fifth enlargement of the Union is the concern on the 
‗underdeveloped‘ nature of the economies of the acceding countries: Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  Old members‘ national trade 
unions expressed concern that businesses would relocate their operations to new members‘ 
territories to enjoy lower taxation and lower labor and healthcare related costs. As Hunya (2004) 
notes, there is sufficient evidence in the shifts of capital, labor and investment of foreign 
investment enterprises to support a ‗flying geese‘ development model. He observes that 
transnational corporations from the medium income to high income countries relocated to low 
and low-medium-tech export-oriented subsidiaries in the low-cost Central and Eastern European 
countries in the period from 1998 to 2002. 
 
3.1. Epistemic Communities with Epistemic Authority 
The growing complexity of global issues have time and again shown that traditional 
nation-centric policy approaches have produced dismal results both on the national and 
international level despite the disproportionate amount of resources behind such policies. The 
growing interdependence among states has all but nullified the returns that self-serving behavior 
of states brings. In recognizing this trend, many scholars have tried to get out of the blind alley 
of traditional realism. The overarching trend which prompted scholars to do so was the 
seemingly dwindling relative power-monopoly of states in the international system. Therefore, 
inventing overlaying structures could help explain the new trend in state behavior—cooperation 
as opposed to the realist ‗anarchic‘ system with self-serving state behavior. 
 
Keohane (1989, p. 173) acknowledged the need for a ‗reflective‘ approach and expressed 
disappointment in the absence of ―a research program that shows in particular studies that it can 
illuminate important issues in world politics.‖ Krasner (1985)  notes the importance of shared 
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beliefs in explaining the Group of 77 (G-77) cooperation. Moreover he underscores the role of 
shared understanding in regime creation. Keohane (1984) posits the possibility that states may 
learn to recalculate their interests. As political actors interact with each other, the ambit of their 
shared meanings increases and even more so if and when they recognize a common interest and 
common political opportunities. Gilpin (1981, p. 227) describes situations when states [and 
political actors] ―learn to be more enlightened in their definitions of their interests and can learn 
to be more cooperative in their behavior.‖ 
 
In the last decades, much attention has been focused on the cognitive aspects of human 
decision-making.  George (1980, p. 55) observes that ―developments in psychology have 
produced a major paradigm shift referred to by some as ‗a cognitive revolution.‘‖  Previous 
cognitive models portrayed man as a consistency-seeker—suggesting that potentially valuable 
and useful information would be disregarded and or discarded unless it fits in the existing world-
view of the individual.  The ‗post-revolutionary‘ model portrays man as a problem solver—
suggesting that individuals actively seek out relevant information in order to solve a particular 
problem.19  Portraying individuals as information-seekers would lead us to consider that 
information-providers can have significant influence on the individual‘s attitudes and his 
behavior (Sundström, 2000).  
 
The epistemic communities approach is what amounts to a reflective response to the 
challenge that Keohane brought forward. Going from [individual] human volition to local, 
national and international action requires that agents have a minimum amount of shared 
                                                 
19  Although the traditional and post-revolutionary models are presented in juxtapose, it is important to note that 
the view that man is a problem-solver by no means supersedes the view that man is a consistency-seeker. It may be 
argued that the post-revolutionary model only tries to build on and expand the scope of the traditional model. 
George (1980, p. 56) notes: ―This recent emphasis on viewing man as a problem-solver does not mean that is no 
longer fruitful to view man as a consistency-seeker in certain contexts. What it does is to overcome the narrowness 
of the earlier model of man as merely a consistency-seeker…‖  
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understandings about how different variables interact and which combination of actions will lead 
to widely acceptable outcomes. Authors who investigated the emergence of epistemic 
communities—networks of knowledge-based experts—have recognized that between systemic 
conditions (i.e. local/national/international structures), knowledge and outcomes lies human 
agency.20 These scholars contend that epistemic communities play a vital role in articulating the 
cause-and-effect relationships of complex issues, helping states identify their interests, framing 
issues [even] before they are brought up, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient 
points of a wide range of issues (Haas, 1992). Haas (1992, p. 3) further argues that the ―control 
over power‖ and the ―diffusion of new ideas and information‖ can lead to varying patterns of 
behavior which leads him to propose that control over knowledge and information is an 
important dimension of [political] power. 
 
An epistemic community is a network of professionals with a certain level of recognized 
(and often) shared expertise in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant  
knowledge within that domain of issue-area (Haas, 1992). These professionals continually build 
upon each others‘ work in an atmosphere of critical debates which results in continuous 
refinements of their (often) divergent arguments.  It is specifically this activity which lends 
credence and authority to their claims. Furthermore, Haas lays down the particular characteristics 
of epistemic communities: 
i. a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale 
for the social action of community members; 
ii. shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or 
contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the 
basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired 
                                                 
20  See, for example, Wendt (1987). 
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outcomes; 
iii. shared notions of validity—that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for 
weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and, 
iv. a common policy enterprise, that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of 
problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the 
conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.21 
 
Epistemic policy coordination has a simple causal logic with the major dynamics being 
uncertainty, interpretation and institutionalization (Haas, 1992).  The forms of uncertainty that 
arise and tend to stimulate agents‘ demands for information stem from the strong dependence of 
each agent‘s choice of action for obtaining the necessary results on other agents‘ choice(s). In the 
case of states, this manifests in their strong dependence on other relevant (and at times 
irrelevant) states‘ policy choices for obtaining specific results.  
 
Table 1 below illustrates the major analytical paradigms that examine plausible drivers of 
policy change by comparing the epistemic communities approach with other approaches to the 
study of policy change advanced by international relations scholars.   
 
                                                 
21  Adler and Haas (1992) note that characteristics of epistemic communities that are worth considering include: 
members of an epistemic community share intersubjective understandings; have a shared way of knowing; have 
shared patterns of reasoning; have a policy project drawing on shared values, shared causal beliefs, and the use of 
shared discursive practices; and have a shared commitment to the application and production of knowledge.  
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Table 1: Approaches to the study of policy change 
Approach 
Level of analysis and 
area of study 
Factors that influence 
policy change 
Mechanisms and 







Knowledge; causal and 
principled beliefs. 
Diffusion of information 
and learning; shifts in the 




Neorealist approaches22 International; states in 




of costs and benefits 
from actions. 
Technological change and 
war; shifts in the available 
power resources of states 








of states in the global 
division of labor; control 
over economic 
resources. 
Changes in production; 
shifts in the location of 
states in the global 
division of labor. 









Usage of meanings of 
words. 
Discourse; the opening of 
new political spaces and 
opportunities. 
Unclear. 
Source: Haas (1992, p. 6) 
 
3.2. Transnational Networks, Transnational Protest and Policy Change 
By focusing on the interaction involving nonstate actors in international relations, Keck 
and Sikkink (1998) distinguish three different categories of transnational networks according to 
their motivations: (1) those with essentially instrumental goals, especially transnational 
corporations and banks; (2) those motivated primarily by shared causal ideas, such as scientific 
groups or epistemic communities; and (3) those motivated primarily by  shared principles ideas 
or values (transnational [protest] advocacy networks). In addition to their intrinsic motivation, 
these categories of transnational networks also differ in their endowment of resources and 
patterns of influence.  Among actors with instrumental goals, one would expect that economic 
resources would carry the most influence. In epistemic communities, technical expertise and the 
ability to convince policy makers of the significance of these expertises become the currency. In 
transnational protest networks, although very similar to epistemic communities in their reliance 
on information, framing along with interpretation and strategic use of information is most 
important (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). 
                                                 
22  For examples, see Gilpin (1981), Krasner (1985), Waltz (1979). 
23  For examples, see Cardoso & Faletto (1979), Evans (1979, 1989), Galtung (1973, 1980), Wallerstein (1979). 
24  For examples, see Der Derian & Shapiro (1989), Ashley & Walker (1990). 
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During the early years of the epistemic communities approach, theorists excluded activist 
groups from their definition. Epistemic communities were seen mainly as groups of scientists, 
limited to more technical issues in international relations. On the other hand, activists and 
protest networks were considered as actors who were ―not considered by canons of reasoning‖ 
and who framed issues in simplistic terms by dividing the world into ―bad guys‖ and ―good 
guys‖ (Peterson, 1992, pp. 149, 155). In recent years, this partition has slowly blurred in 
recognition of the increasing number of ‗technical and scientific experts‘ entering and 
propagating the discourse in protest networks.25 In Dobusch‘s and Quack‘s (2008) work, they 
analyzed the transnational dynamics present in the case of the Creative Commons.26 They looked 
at the organizational and ideational features of the Creative Commons (1) as a transnational 
community with its own shared identity, and (2) its roles in international rule setting. Table 2 
compares the key features of epistemic communities and social movements as presented by 
Dobusch and Quack. 
Table 2: Comparison of the key features of epistemic communities  
and social movements 
 Epistemic Communities Social Movements 
Common Political Project Yes Yes 
Shared Interests Yes Yes 
Shared Principles Beliefs Yes Yes 
Size Limited Large 
Boundaries Relatively clear Fuzzy 
Internal Heterogeneity Low High 
Causal Beliefs Consensual Disputed or absent 
Knowledge Base Shared Not necessarily shared 
Means of Changing the World Persuasion by facts and arguments Persuasion and pressure by action and 
framing 
Source: Dobusch & Quack (2008, p. 10) 
 
                                                 
25
  See Bendell & Ellersiek (2009) and Calavita (2002), among others. 
26
  The Creative Commons was founded in 2001 as a US-based non-profit organization pushing for the inclusion of 
a ―reasonable, flexible copyright‖ into existing restrictive copyright laws. Creative Commons develops licenses that 
enable people to dedicate their creative works to the public domain—or retain their copyright while licensing them 
as free for certain uses, on certain conditions.  It was initially seen as an experiment in favor of the free use of 
intellectual products such as texts, music and software. Other organizations in the wider transnational community 
also actively support the ideas of ―free use‖ and ―share alike.‖ In the field of free and open source software, the Free 
Software Foundation; in artistic production and information, the Wikimedia Foundation; in science, different open 
access initiatives with the Budapest Open Access Initiative as an example. 
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4. CASE STUDY: Transnational Protest, European Integration and the ESF 
4.1. Protest Going Transnational 
 ―For two exceptional centuries, European states and their extensions 
elsewhere have succeeded remarkably in circumscribing and controlling the resources 
within their perimeters… But in our era… at least in Europe, the era of strong state 
is now ending‖ (Tilly, 1994, p. 3). 
 
The progression of social movement protest from the national to the transnational 
requires a broader historical perspective by confronting it with previous forms of collective 
action and social movements (Cattacin, Giugni, & Passy, 1997).  Table 3 portrays the relations 
between social movements and the state since the seventeenth century. Cattacin, Giugni and 
Passy (1997) distinguish between five phases in the course of the development of European 
[civil] society.  Each phase is determined by a central social conflict which structured potential 
political contention during the period. 
 
Table 3: Phases of development of the European society and social movements 
Dimensions and 
periods Central conflict Main movements 




State expansion Anti-tax revolts and other forms of 
resistance to state expansion 
Absolutist state; war/direct extraction of 
human and financial resources 
Nineteenth century Class struggle and poverty Labor movement Liberal state; rights, action frame 
1900-1960 Distribution of welfare Institutionalization of the labor 
movement 
Welfare state; planning/nationalization 
1960-1990 Bureaucratization of society and 
risks linked to economic growth 
New Social Movements Welfare state; planning/regulation 
Since 1990 Justice and democracy on a global 
scale 
Global Justice Movements Multilevel governance; neoliberalism/loss 
of control 
Source: Adapted from Cattacin, Giugni & Passy (1997) cited in Giugni, Bandler & Eggert (2006, p. 4). 
 
The first phase, roughly covering the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is the period of 
the expansion of the nation-state, subjecting its population to its authority in ―more direct and 
intrusive ways‖ (Giugni, Bandler, & Eggert, 2006, p. 4). In this phase, the nation-state is 
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extensively engaged in war-making to expand its territories.  Consequently, the main form of 
contention during this period was the resistance to the expansion of the absolutist state.  The 
second phase, roughly around the nineteenth century, saw the consolidation of industrial 
capitalism and the creation of the proletariat class (Giugni, Bandler, & Eggert, 2006) which in 
turn gave rise to class conflict. The central conflicts then were class struggle and poverty and it 
was the labor movement that became the main social movement engaged in collective action. 
The third phase saw the distribution of welfare as its central conflict during the period covering 
more or less the early twentieth century.  The labor movement remained the principal actor 
during this period despite the emergence of new types of movements—peace movements, for 
example.  New social movements (NSMs) are typically traced from the late 1960s until the early 
1990s.  This fourth phase saw the emergence of resistance to the increasing bureaucratization of 
society (Giugni, Bandler, & Eggert, 2006).  Peace movements, ecology movements, antinuclear 
movements and women‘s movements mobilized around this central issue against the increasingly 
planning and regulating welfare state. Around the 1990s, a new form of contention emerged—
transnational contention which today is embodied by the Global Justice Movement (GJM).  
Arguably, this new movement combined the claims for welfare distribution of the labor 
movements with the claims to emancipation of the NSMs. 
 
Cattacin, Giugni and Passy (1997) also analyzed the impact of social movements along the 
dimension of their central claims and means of action. Table 4 below illustrates four dimensions 
of social contention according to their central claims.  First, anti-tax revolts and other forms of 
resistance to the state were intended as opposition to the direct extraction of resources by the 
state.  These manifested themselves largely as local revolts whose impacts were narrow and 
unsustained. Second, labor movements pushed for the improvement of working and living 
conditions as well as for redistribution policies. One clear impact of labor movement protests 
was the institutionalization labor movements in interest representation. Third, NSMs have 
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broadly mobilized for a diminution of risks in society and advanced greater individual autonomy 
(Giugni, Bandler, & Eggert, 2006).  Their agendas of contention have generally demonstrated the 
pluralism of civil society.  Fourth, despite the heterogeneity of the composition of the GJM as 
well as the diversity of the claims it advances, the struggle against neoliberalism and the 
promotion of democracy can be considered its central claim. The need to struggle against 
neoliberalism is almost universally shared by the participants of the GJM largely due to the 
widely held view that neoliberalism further entrenches inequalities in society.  The gap between 
the global North and global South has been the focus of this contention and, by way of 
extension, culpability is ascribed to international economic institutions considered to be the main 
drivers of neoliberal globalization—the World Bank, IMF, WTO, multinational lending 
institutions, etc. 
 
Table 4: Central claims, privileged means of action and major impacts of social movements 
Dimensions of movements Central claims Privileged means of action Major impacts 
Anti-tax revolts and other forms 
of resistance to state expansion 
Opposition to taxes and to the 




Local and temporary (often 
weak) 
Labor movement Improvement of work and living 
conditions/ redistribution 
policies 
Strikes/mass demonstrations Institutionalization within the 
interest representation 
circuit/acceleration of the 
establishment of the welfare state 
NSMs Diminution of risks in society Mass demonstrations/direct 
actions/lobbying/media 
Acknowledgement of the 
pluralism of society 




forums/ democratic deliberation 
Democratization of society 
Source: Adapted from Cattacin, Giugni & Passy (1997) cited in Giugni, Bandler & Eggert (2006, p. 6). 
 
The number of protests directed at EU institutions can be linked to the ―undeniable deficit 
in representative democracy—supposing that protestors could produce disagreements and 
criticisms, these would be difficult to mobilize against an unaccountable and opaque target‖ 
(della Porta & Caiani, 2009, p. 42). Bendell, Ellersiek and Vermeulen (2008) point out that 
various groups of activists thus seem to recognize their own concerns in the critiques put 
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forward by large coalitions and join them or build their own coalitions. Hence, coalitions often 
overlap and are composed of all kinds of activist groups and among them are non-governmental 
organizations, human rights groups, community organizations, churches, environmentalists, pro-
democracy campaigners, communists, peace groups, anarchists, farmers, indigenous people‘s 
groups, etc. 
 
In the last few decades we have witnessed the expansion of political expression from the 
―traditionally public‖ issues of the welfare, security and job provision by the state to ―post-
materialist‖27 and ―post-industrialist‖ issues of gender, environment and world peace.  However, 
in spite of the varying definitions and manner of employing the three facets of the classic social 
movement agenda, the present explanations of political contention via social movements share 
one common characteristic—they are all based on a nation-centric view of social movements 
(Giugni, Bandler, & Eggert, 2006). Tilly‘s ground-breaking works (1984, 1986, 1994) laid the 
foundations for modern protest politics during the period of transformation from an old to a 
new repertoire of contention and since then, social movements have consistently been examined 
within the confines of the nation-state.28 
 
The general understandings of social movements have developed with the mostly implicit 
assumption that the modern nation-state serves as the [only salient] context for political 
contention (Tilly, 1984). Despite the growing recognition by social scientists that the 
globalization process has transformed traditional state structures, the view of the nation-state 
being the main venue for and the defining element of political opportunities for collective action 
                                                 
27  Contemporary theorists have related the emergence of new social movements to the notion of postmaterialism 
advanced by R. Inglehart. In Inglehart‘s (1977) book, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles 
Among Western Publics, he refers to a new religious moral against ―consumerism;‖ some major contemporary 
theorists who have had important contributions to articulating the concept of postmaterialism within the context of 
their own intellectual sphere and traditions include: Manuel Castells, Alain Touraine, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal 
Mouffe, Claus Offe, Alberto Melucci, Immanuel Wallerstein and Jürgen Habermas. 
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remains pervasive (Tarrow, 2001, 2005).  In particular, while it is the case that state structures are 
the ones that govern policy making and activities of political association, resource mobilization 
and political expression, research and experience suggest the view that states are embedded in an 
―increasingly influential global polity that affects political conflicts‖ (Smith, H., 2002, p. 2). And 
McAdam (1999, p. xxxi) notes it accurately when he states, ―[b]y orienting their analysis to shifts 
in domestic opportunities, scholars in the political process traditionally have generally failed to 
appreciate the multiple embeddings that shape the interpretations of actions of political actors.‖ 
 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (1995) highlighted the centrality of globalization and 
transnational contention to the study of social movements. Giugni (1998) puts forward a general 
framework for explaining why movements in different national settings tend to assume similar 
forms. These cross-national similarities Giugni attributed to three global-level processes:  
 
i. globalization, which leads movements in different contexts to respond similarly to 
common transnational threats or opportunities; 
ii. structural affinity, whereby global pressures lead states to mimic structures and policies 
of other actors in their environment, consequently producing similar opportunity 
structures for collective action; and, 
iii. diffusion processes, which occur as information and ideas about collective action in 
different countries. 
 
In analyzing cross-national similarities between social movements, Giugni (1998) singles 
out concrete items which could be tested by empirical observations. He examines six movement 
aspects that tend to be shared.  First, social movements may address similar issues, themes and 
goals.  States and societies all over the globe have witnessed the rise of the same movements 
such as peace movements, women‘s movements and environmental/ecology movements. NSMs 
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illustrate how issues and themes of protests in different contexts can resemble each other 
irrespective of the territorial location. Although movements across countries may vary in size, 
their goals tend to converge or are at least similar. Moreover, Giugni observes that the targets of 
protest actions often coincide: nuclear power plants, air and water pollution, the army, nuclear 
weapons, abortions rights, to name a few. 
 
Second, movements ―may display similar levels of mobilization‖—they organize similar 
numbers of protest actions and/or involve similar numbers of participants in these said protest 
actions (Giugni, 1998, p. 91). NSMs, for example, have been shown to have mobilized to a 
roughly similar extent in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland from 1975 to 1989, while in 
France the level of organization was comparably much lower. However, it is important to note 
that the difference is less pronounced among the four countries‘ whole social movement sectors 
since ‗old‘ social movements were stronger in France than in any of the three other countries 
(Kreisi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995). 
 
Third, the strategies, tactics and forms of action may converge. Giugni notes though that 
research on this dimension has so far focused on the cross-national variations of action 
repertoires (Giugni, 1998). Even though protests vary in their degree of radicalism across 
national contexts, street demonstrations for example, prevail everywhere. The popular adoption 
of non-violent ‗sit-in‘ protests is also a good example. 
 
Fourth, it may be observed that social movements have similar organizational structures—
which refer to the level of resource and other organizational features (centralized/decentralized, 
formal/informal, integrated/isolated, etc.).  Taking the example of NSMs, at the early stages of 
their development they utilized non-hierarchical, participatory forms of organization (Giugni, 
1998).  In Gerlach‘s (1999, p. 87) terms, ―segmented, polycentric, informal networks‖ or SPIN. 
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Fifth, cultural frames, ideas and discourses may show similar patterns (McAdam & Rucht, 
1993).  In specific terms, these refer to the ideological, symbolic and interpretative substance of 
protest and mobilization activities: the Marxist-Leninist and Maoist slogans employed by 
European student mobilizations in the sixties; the small-is-beautiful slogan of the early ecology 
movements pushing forward the sustainable development concept; the nuclear-free zone 
concept, to name a few. 
 
Sixth, the [parallel] timing of the protests (Giugni, 1998).  This point is illustrated by the 
almost simultaneous rise in student protests in the late 1960s, mobilization against the 
deployment of NATO missiles in the 1980s, and the strong opposition to the communist regime 
in Eastern Europe, protest against nuclear power plants which peaked in many of the Western 
industrialized countries between 1975 and 1977 (Giugni, 1998).  
 
4.2. The European Social Forums 
―The European Social forum is an open meeting space designed for in-depth 
reflection, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of 
experiences and planning of effective action among entities and movements of civil 
society that are engaged in building a planetary society centered on the human being‖ 
(FSE-ESF.org, 2008). 
 
In hosting the first European Social Forum in November 2002, Florence played host to a 
gathering of movements and activists from all over Europe with the purpose of expressing their 
disagreement with the outright commitment of European governments to free market policies, 
growing [international and regional] militarism. This chapter sets out to portray as well as provide 
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a critical analysis of how the annual ESF provide a transnational public arena for (1) 
contestation, and (2) legitimation of the European integration project from below. 
 
In pioneering research into political spaces, Melucci (1985) argues that social movements 
do not operate along conventional political lines but are concerned instead with the 
democratization of everyday life.  This in turn, requires these movements to organize as 
networks occupying and thriving in an intermediate public space between state and civil society.  
Taking this as a point of departure, I will argue that the process of European integration thus far 
has stimulated enough political opportunities and structures for the emergence of a ‗European 
public sphere‘ which goes by the name of the European Social Forum. 
 
Due to a significant push provided by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (formally, the Treaty 
on European Union) and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 (amending the Treaty of the European 
Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts), the 
accession of new countries in to the Union and the launch of the Euro currency, European 
integration progressed forward at an institutional and administrative level. However, as many 
authors point out, the advances at the political and economic levels have not coincided with 
advances in legitimating structures and as such there has been a crisis of legitimacy within the 
European Union (Fraser, 2007; Koopmans, 2004; Liebert, 2009; Nef, 2002; Rittberger, 2005). 
The perceived crisis comes from two dimensions: (1) a lack of popular identification with the 
EU, and (2) the undemocratic nature of European Union institutions.  
 
In looking at the ESF as an emergent transnational public sphere that draws together ideas 
and proposal on countless alternative European policies one also notes how the resultant 
interaction among activists from different political backgrounds stimulates the formation of a 
more fluid form of transnational contestation.  Consequently, the experimental and inclusionary 
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nature of the ESF lends credence to the possibility of more legitimate forms of political 
participation in the European setting. 
 
First European Social Forum—Florence, November 2002.  
Owing to preparatory meetings in Brussels, Vienna and Thessaloniki, more than 600 
organizations participated in the Florence ESF in an effort to promote democratic participation 
from below.29 Italian organizations hosting the event proposed the following thematic 
framework for the actual form of the Florence ESF:30 
 
i. The creation of a Citizen‘s Charter for Europe; 
ii. An agenda for mobilizations against war, militarization of politics and the 
production of weapons in the European Union; 
iii. Europe‘s role in the world with particular attention to Central Eastern 
Europe and the Mediterranean area; 
iv. The organization of cultural events and mass demonstrations in new forms. 
 
The above choice of focus issues reflected the growing dissatisfaction of the public with 
the policies and decisions that make up the current process of European integration. The two 
broad themes underlying the proposed framework were: (1) the processes of European 
integration, and (2) the question of social citizenship based on the creation of an alternative 
charter of social rights. Participants stressed the need for inclusiveness and representation in the 
ESF for groups and individuals who suffer from social and economic exclusion (women, 
migrants, the movement of the ‗have-nots,‘ for example).  
 
                                                 
29
  See the Carolan (2002) 
30
  See the Appeal for the Vienna Preparatory Meetings on www.fse-esf.org. 
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The structure of the forum allowed for the possibility of conducting workshops ad hoc in 
parallel with well organized conferences. This further underscored the idea of a public space and 
gave freedom to various groups to prepare meetings during the course of the forum. 
 
Second European Social Forum—Paris, November 2003.  
The eastern suburbs of Paris hosted the second ESF one year after the Florence ESF. In 
preparing for the Paris ESF, some 300 French social movements, NGOs and trade unions spent 
a year organizing the event.  A monthly French assembly endorsed the work of the organizing 
committee run by volunteers from organizations that had the resources. The three preparatory 
meetings in Paris (December 2002), Brussels (February 2003) and Genoa (May 2003) reinforced 
and coordinated the efforts of organizers. 
 
The Paris preparatory meeting took place in the trade union centre of Saint Denis. With 
more than 300 delegates from 25 countries worldwide, the preparatory meeting discussed the 
proposed framework for the Paris ESF.  Bernard Cassen from ATTAC, France, pushed the 
argument that in order for the Paris ESF to successfully widen the scope of the Florence ESF, it 
should ensure a wider participation of Central and Eastern countries to create a more united and 
representative forum towards the European Union‘s initiatives and directives.31 The Brussels 
meeting specified the objectives of the Paris ESF along with its main course of action. It was 
Pierre Khalfa of the French preparatory committee who stressed the importance of articulating 
an in-depth critique of the state of Europe and European integration as well as to define the 
alternative Europe that the activists wanted. He further stressed that the significance of the forum 
in the creation of a European social movement and reiterated the Forum‘s dual function as a site 
                                                 
31
  See the minutes from the Paris meeting on www.fse-esf.org. 
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for debate and discussion and a basis for mobilizations and social movements.32 It was during the 
Brussels meeting that the thematic frame work of the Paris ESF was adopted. The themes of the 
plenaries revolved around:33 
i. Against war: for a Europe of peace and justice open to the world; 
ii. Against neoliberalism and patriarchy: for a social and democratic Europe of 
rights; 
iii. Against the singular pursuit of profit: for an ecologically sustainable society of 
social justice and for food sovereignty; 
iv. Against commercialism: for a Europe of democratic information, culture and 
education; 
v. Against racism, xenophobia and exclusion: for the equality of rights, dialogue 
between cultures; for a Europe open to immigrants, refugees and asylum 
seekers. 
 
The Genoa meeting included the finalization of the program: plenaries, seminars and 
workshops; the logistical organization of the ESF—venues, travel, translation, etc.; and, the 
enlargement of the ESF. 
 
At the meeting for the program, a debate about the diminishing attention on opposing the 
war on Iraq and imperialism stirred up the organizers and participants as only two out of the 
fifty-five plenaries were dealing with the subject.  In response to this, some participants pointed 
out that the Florence ESF had focused almost too narrowly on opposing the impending war on 
Iraq that it left a number of issues unaddressed. For example, the efforts to provide alternative 
economic and social aspects against a neo-liberal Europe were barely addressed in the Florence 
                                                 
32
  See the minutes from the Brussels meeting on www.fse-esf.org. 
33
  See Paris 2003 Reports on www.fse-esf.org. 
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ESF. Susan George from ATTAC, France, brought up the point that the ―EU‘s future 
constitution establishes liberalism as the official doctrine of the EU, when it should protect and 
guarantee the social rights of Citizens.‖34 
 
During the Paris ESF itself, 51,000 delegates gathered in solidarity. Participants had the 
possibility of participating in a large number of activities in both the official program as well as 
various side-events spread around the city.  The closing demonstration on November 15, 2003 
saw almost 100,000 participants denouncing the present form of globalization. This image was 
markedly different from the picture of the generally diverse composition of the plenaries during 
the two-days of plenaries. 
 
Third European Social Forum—London, October 2004.  
London as the host for the third European Social Forum came up as a proposal in Paris 
and it was an agreement between the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the Greater London 
Authority (GLA). This decision was a source of tension during the initial stages because (1) it 
was approved in a closed meeting, and (2) London as an option was never debated among 
British movements. GLA‘s involvement was a demand made by certain actors, such as ATTAC 
France, to ensure that the event was financially viable (Nunes, 2004). 
  
Another source of tension was that the presence of the SWP and GLA was seen as an 
antithesis to the participation of British trade unions and networks which employ the ad hoc and 
horizontal ways of organizing—without hierarchies and decision-making centers.  This prompted 
the Preparatory Assembly that occurred in London in February 2004 to demand that the British 
                                                 
34
  See the minutes from the Genoa meeting on www.fse-esf.org. 
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groups should work towards some degree of stable coordination between the verticals (SWP, 
Socialist Action(SA), trade unions) and the horizontals(the rest) (Nunes, 2004). 
 
During the Berlin preparatory meeting, the choice of themes for the plenaries was a 
difficult negotiation between the verticals and the Continental actors (composed of the 
Confederazione del Comitati di Base, Transnational Institute, ATTAC, the Greek Social Forum, 
etc.). The SWP (on the side of the verticals) wanted to make exhaustive use of the theme of the 
opposition to the War on Terror so as to augment the influence of the Stop the War Coalition, 
while the Continental actors favored the enrichment of the political agenda to include issues 
covering neo-liberalism, the European Constitution and citizens‘ rights. Eventually, six themes 
were adopted for the London ESF:35 
 
i. War and Peace; 
ii. Democracy and Fundamental Rights; 
iii. Social Justice and Solidarity: Against Privatization; for Workers, Social and 
Women‘s Rights; 
iv. Corporate Globalization and Global Justice 
v. Against Racism, Discrimination and the Far Right: For Equality and 
Diversity; 
vi. Environmental Crisis, against Neo-liberalism and for a Sustainable Society. 
 
                                                 
35
  See the minutes from the Berlin meeting on www.fse-esf.org. 
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Fourth European Social Forum—Athens, May 2006. 
In organizing the Athens ESF, 167 movements, organizations and trade unions 
participated in three preparatory meetings—Athens (February 2005), Prague (May 2005) and, 
Istanbul (September 2005). 
 
The Athens ESF shied away from adopting a static thematic framework and this was 
evident in the correspondences during the preparatory meetings. On the first preparatory 
meeting which occurred in February 2005 in Athens, the Preparatory Assembly expressed the 
need to renew the preparatory methodology, the format and the territory of the Forum.  The 
preparatory committee decided not to finalize the priority thematic axes. The following fourteen 
thematic axes were proposed:36 
 
i. War and peace. Occupation of Iraq, Palestine, militarization of Europe, bases, 
Kosovo, imperialism in Asia and Latin America, anti-war movement; 
ii. Europe and neoliberal globalization. WTO, international organizations; 
iii. Migrants in Europe; 
iv. Discrimination, racism and the far right; 
v. Social rights recognized as common goods—public services; 
vi. Flexible working, precarious jobs, poverty and exclusion; 
vii. The state of work, productivity, unemployment; 
viii. Environment. climate change, sustainable development; 
ix. Towards which democracy in Europe and which fundamental rights: 
citizenship, federalism and the place of states, stateless people, European 
institutions; 
                                                 
36
  See Decisions from the Prague Meeting on www.fse-esf.org. 
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x. Political economy in Europe: central bank, monetary convergence criteria; 
xi. The right to education, mass media and culture; 
xii. Women‘s movements; 
xiii. Strategy for moving from Seattle to today; 
xiv. Which way forward for the European Union: for which Europe do we 
struggle? 
 
The preparatory meeting further reiterated that the thematic areas are ―neither solid, nor 
isolated‖ and that there has to be a common ground between the various themes. However, to 
provide a general guideline the committee outlined the following aims:37 
 
i. to involve as many movements as possible, networks, organizations, 
individuals which, all over Europe—at the international, regional, national, 
local level—can join the global movement for a different world; 
ii. to improve the strength of the European Social Movements of working and 
fighting together for another Europe, refusing war, neoliberalism, racism, 
sexism and patriarchy, a Europe based on peace and rights; 
iii. to highlight and witness the variety of experiences of social struggles; 
iv. to improve the capability to deepen the dialogue and the debate between 
different approaches and identities in order to make steps forward in the 
definition of alternative policies and practices; 
v. to facilitate and improve communication between movements and 
organizations, the process of networking, the building up of common 
agendas, campaigns, actions, mobilizations. 
                                                 
37
  See Final Statement on Methodology of the Athens meeting on www.fse-esf.org. 
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The Athens ESF hosted about 35,000 registered participants and the Greek organizers 
themselves admitted that the number was unexpectedly high. An estimated 80,000 people 
participated in the demonstration on the last day of the Forum.  The seminars and workshops 
were conducted in a much smaller scale which allowed everyone ample time to speak and 
network with each other. 
 
Domestically, the Athens ESF was a success. The main organizers, the Greek Social 
Forum and the Synapsismos party (closely affiliated with Greek social movements) had, prior to 
the ESF, been on the fringes of Greek politics. But their participation in the organizing 
committee gave them and their agenda the much needed boost in publicity as well as network 
connections. In terms of enlarging the ESF, the Athens ESF was also a big success in terms of 
its inclusion of Eastern European countries.  Solidarity funds for Central and Eastern Europeans 
including Turkey and Middle Eastern participants made possible the participation of over 2000 
delegates from these countries and showed that the Forum appeals to the whole continent and 
not just to Western European countries. It reaffirmed the importance of the Forum for social 
movements by providing an opportunity for social movements to network and share their 
expertise.  
 
Fifth European Social Forum—Malmö, September 2008. 
Four preparatory meetings were conducted prior to the Malmö ESF—Lisbon (April 2007), 
Stockholm (September  2007), Berlin (February 2008), Kiev (June 2008). In those meetings 
 
The Axes/Thematic framework of the Forum were:38 
                                                 
38
  See the Main Decisions of the Berlin Meeting on www.fse-esf.org. 
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i. Working for social inclusion and social rights—welfare, public services and 
common goods for all; 
ii. Working for a sustainable world, food sovereignty, environmental and 
climate justice; 
iii. Building a democratic and rights based Europa, against ―securitarian‖ 
policies. For participation, openness, equality, freedom and minority rights; 
iv. Working for equality and rights, acknowledging diversities, against all forms 
of discrimination. For feminist alternatives against patriarchy; 
v. Building a Europe for a world of justice, peace and solidarity—against war 
militarism and occupations; 
vi. Building labor strategies based on people‘s needs and rights, for economic 
and social justice; 
vii. Democratizing knowledge, culture, education, information and mass media; 
viii. Working for a Europe of inclusiveness and equality for refugees and 
migrants—fighting against all forms of racism and discrimination. 
 
The size of the Malmö ESF was below expectation (around 10,000 registered participants 
while 20,000 were expected, initially).  Compared to the previous Forums, Malmö was the 
smallest city to ever host the ESF.  The venues were scattered throughout the city and it was 
difficult for an individual to get an overview of the forum. A review of the Malmö ESF stated 
that, ―The vast majority of the seminars were alienating to young people‖ (Flakin, 2008). An 
event would last two and a half hours of which two hours were for speeches from the podium 
and a half hour was for ―discussion.‖ Discussions were normally comprised of reading different 
communiqués. 
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Despite the challenges that the Malmö ESF faced, the overarching consensus reached was 
that there is a need to advance the ‗Europeanization‘ of resistance. This meant a two-fold 
challenge for European social movements. First, there exists a need to build up their structures 
and support from below. In other words, social movement organizations need to deepen their 
local roots. Second, social movement organizations needed to create various forms of national 
and international expression that encourage social resistance in spaces like the forums, networks 
and campaigns (Vivas, 2008). 
 
4.3. The European Social Forum—An Emerging European Public Sphere? 
―It is important build institutions that encourage and protect multiple, 
discontinuous, sometimes conflicting public spaces and modes of public engagement 
rather than attempt to nurture or impose some unified European culture‖(Calhoun, 
2003, pp. 29-70). 
 
A direct effect of the recurrent mobilizations of European movements is the formation of 
a relatively stable transnational network of organizations.  In broad terms, the space for protest 
and discussion being advanced by the European Social Forums involves certain fundamental 
aspects of a legitimate public sphere. Firstly, the participation in the Forums is open. The 
Forums welcome any and all who wish to participate with the exception of right-wing parties 
(whose very principles contradict the idea of open debates and discussions in the ESF).  Further, 
the various ESF coordinating organizations strive for a more inclusive participation by reaching 
out to as many movements, organizations and trade unions in Europe through the fundamental 
recognition of their diversity. Secondly, the topics dealt with in the Forums have increasingly 
covered a broad spectrum of socio-political, economic and environmental issues thus 
underscoring the flexibility of the space being advanced by the ESFs. 
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Although policy makers have a strong tendency to discredit and dismiss the discourses of 
the Forums, they are often forced to take the subject matter more seriously.  Consider, for 
example, the proposal for an international Tobin Tax regime presented to the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) of the European Council in Liège in September 2001.39 
According to its proponents the Tobin tax40 would (1) reduce instability of global financial 
markets by deterring speculations that cause sharp exchange rate fluctuations, and (2) generate 
substantial sums, which could be used to alleviate problems of poverty, the environment and 
[human] security. Prior to the ECOFIN Summit, the European Banking Federations (EBF)41 
published a position paper in March 2001 expressing their concern that the Tobin tax is being 
placed on the political agenda in several countries. According to their report, the Tobin tax is not 
feasible in practice and would have disruptive and frequently unjustified side effects on the 
global financial markets that would render it ineffective in achieving its original goals. 
 
Underlying such issues as the Tobin tax regime proposal is the fact that modern states 
have an inherently transnational character: globalization, peace, sustainable development, 
migration and host of others, require a transnational approach rather than government responses 
constrained by national barriers. This lends credence to the fact that these organizations and 
movements are increasingly bringing up their agenda to the European level rather than to 




                                                 
39
  The Liège ECOFIN Summit took place on September 21 to 23, 2001. 
40
  The Tobin tax proposal entails the levying of a (small) tax on each foreign exchange transaction. The revenue 
would then be used to alleviate poverty.  A UK charity, War on Want, estimates that about 285 billion Euros could 
be raised globally if a 0.25% tax was levied on each foreign exchange transaction. Among the staunchest proponents 
of the Tobin tax regime are War on Want (UK) and ATTAC (France). 
41
  The EBF represents the national banking associations of the 31 EU and EFTA countries, totaling some 5000 
European banks: large and small, wholesale and retail, local and cross-border financial institutions. 
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5. A [Provisional] Conclusion: From Discursive Power to the Activism-Policy Nexus 
The conventional narrative of how the broader civil society agenda was included into 
European Union affairs could be encapsulated as follows. First, owing to a growing 
dissatisfaction with the ―democratic deficit‖ of European Union institutions which became 
apparent in failed referenda, state heads and governments prompted European Union 
institutions to come closer to its citizens (European Communities, 2001, p. 20). Moreover, the 
European Commission, concerned with its reputation after the mass resignations of members of 
the Santer Commission,42 further underscored the need for Europe to connect with its citizens.  
With this in mind, the Commission identified the reform of European governance as one of its 
strategic objectives (European Commission, 2001). In Romano Prodi‘s speech at the European 
Parliament, he mentioned how the Constitutional Convention established ―the principle of 
participatory democracy‖ as an additional pillar of the ―democratic life of the Union,‖ next to 
―the principle of representative democracy,‖ and as such he and his Commission declared that 
they would ―devise a completely new form of governance‖ (Prodi, 2001) which included the 
active participation of civil society.  These initiatives influenced two paradigms for policy-making 
in the subsequent years.  The first paradigm, as expounded by Guy Peters, concerned the 
plausibility of a withering away of government and the emergence of a new system of public-
private partnerships in the participatory state (Peters, 1996) which would ultimately emerge from 
transnational decision making.  The second paradigm concerned a profound skepticism that 
elections and party politics are no longer suitable and appropriate mechanisms to legitimate 
public authorities in the larger backdrop of democratic legitimacy in the multi-level system of 
European governance (Lebessis & Paterson, 2000). The natural recourse was to turn to civil 
                                                 
42
  The Santer Commission was the European Commission in office between January 1995 and March 1999. The 
Commission was led by the former Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Santer. In the run-up to March 1999, 
the Commission suffered allegations of corruption and budget controversies which prompted that a Committee of 
Independent Experts  be set up to look into the controversies. The report cleared all except Edith Cresson of France. 
The subsequent decision of Paris not to recall Cresson sparked a mass resignation of the commissioners of the 
Santer Commission. 
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society as a legitimating mechanism to remedy the crisis of legitimacy haunting the European 
Union institutions (and the modern state in general).   
 
5.1. What Has the ESF Got to Show?  
The World Social Forum‘s Charter of Principles states that social forums are meant to be 
open spaces of discussion which by way of direct extension, also holds for the European Social 
Forum and other regional counterparts.  However, one must note that this space is not given nor 
is it taken as a given. It is created. This process of creation is not without any challenges 
especially since the salient feature of this process are often political controversies and conflicts 
that reveal, test and transform the principles and common values of its participants. 
 
There exists a ―spreading dissatisfaction with the institutions and processes of 
representative democracy‖ (Cain, Dalton, & Scarrow, 2003, p. 1) and this can clearly be seen in 
declining electoral participation and party memberships. Representative democracy is no longer 
held as a compelling proposition. Instead, advanced industrial societies are now experiencing a 
search for new institutional forms to express their interests. Cain, Dalton and Scarrow (2003) 
maintain that the model of representative democracy is increasingly complemented by 
instruments of direct democracy and advocacy democracy. The two later instruments are 
different from representative democracy in that they pertain to unmediated forms of 
participation—categories that encompass many if not all of the aspects of the Social Forums.  
 
Recent initiatives at the EU level have indicated that the shift in citizens‘ participation in 
conventional representative democratic processes to the unmediated forms of participation have 
brought the dilemma of the so-called ‗democratic deficit‘ to the consciousness of European 
policymakers. Rittberger (2005) notes such a phenomenon on at least two critical incidents: (1) 
The [European] Commission White Paper on European Governance (CWP) which contains 
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elements that bear strong resemblances to the tenets of the model of advocacy democracy by 
emphasizing the prominence of non-electoral avenues of participation; and, to fight against 
peoples‘ distrust and lack of interest in political institutions, the Commission advocated that 
democratic institutions at both national and European levels, ―can and must try to connect 
Europe  with its citizens‖ (European Commission, 2001, p. 3). Table 5 below features the three 
models of participation and links them with the policies already in the legislative books of 
European Union institutions.  
 
Table 5: A democratic transformation at the European level? 
 Representative Democracy Direct Democracy Advocacy Democracy 
Core Characteristics Citizen influence mediated by 
representatives (organized in 
political parties) who take 
decisions in behalf of citizens. 
Unmediated citizen influence in 
policy formulation and policy 
choice. 
Unmediated citizen influence in 
policy formulation and 
implementation (policy choices 
rest with political elites). 
Decision-making institutions Electoral institutions (affecting 
inter- and intra-party 
competition) 
Electoral institutions (e.g. 
referenda and popular initiatives). 
Non-electoral institutions (e.g. 
transparency enhancing 
measures; consultation with 
citizens‘ groups) 






— — CWP: better involvement of civil 
society, more openness and 
transparency. 
TCE TCE: enhancing the role of NPs 
through ‗subsidiarity‘ control and 
informational measures 
(Protocols 1 & 2); Art. I-46 (‗The 
principle of representative 




TCE: Art I-47, paragraph 4 
(possibility of citizens‘ initiative). 
TCE: Art. I-47 (‗The principle of 
participatory democracy‘), Art. I-
48 (‗The social partners and 
autonomous social dialogue‘), 
Art. I-49 (‗The European 
Ombudsman‘
46
), Art. I-50 
(‗Transparency of proceedings of 
Union Institutions‘). 
Source: Rittberger (2005, p. 203) 
 
In broad strokes, it is the Social Forums which present a model of unmediated 
participative democracy which appeals to an increasing proportion of the citizens in Europe.  
 
                                                 
43
  CWP: Commission White Paper on European Governance (European Commission, 2001). 
44
  TCE: Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. 
45
  European political parties were first recognized explicitly in the Maastricht Treaty (Art. 191 ECT, ex Art. 138a). 
46
  The position of the European Ombudsman was first created by the Maastricht Treaty (Arts. 21, ex 8d and 195, 
ex 138e of the ECT). 
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5.2. Bottomline: Does the ESF Reduce Partiality and Give Rise to Legitimacy? 
Many authors agree that the model of unmediated form of participation that the Social 
Forum represents opens up other avenues for citizens to voice their concerns. Groups that ‗do 
not‘ or ‗can not‘ enter into the mainstream political processes have such a platform to bring their 
concerns up to the consciousness of the public. Moreover, the general consensus in the literature 
on political contention is that the flaws of the traditional model of representative democracy 
become apparent when extra-territorial issues are introduced into the state system. For instance, 
even though the European Union has a long standing problem with migration, more apparent in 
some countries than others, there still exists no consensus among the member states about how 
to systematically tackle the issue of illegal immigrants on the EU level. 
 
The Forums in themselves do not reduce partiality. ―The channeling of demands directly 
‗from below‘ appears all the more difficult faced with formally closed institutions‖ (della Porta & 
Caiani, 2009, p. 43). Protesters may create alternative discourses and produce disagreements and 
criticisms of different issues but these concepts and discourses would be difficult to mobilize 
against unaccountable targets.  
 
However, the Forums offer two distinct platforms on which protest transnationalization 
occurs. The first platform—the organization of protest events—allows for direct participation 
and advocacy. Various sectors (represented in the mainstream political processes or otherwise) 
are able to articulate issues which have not reached the public‘s consciousness as well as 
continually re-articulate the issues already known. The author admits that on this level, another 
variable needs to be included in the analysis to render more fruitful conclusions—that of the role 
of media in national and European protest events. Due to constraints on time and resources, the 
author made a conscious decision to leave this variable out of the thesis. 
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The second platform—the creation of social and political space—allows for the continual 
articulation and re-articulation of issues which in turn take on emergent properties in the form of 
―activist epistemic communities‖ of experts and specialists that fuel the discourses happening in 
the Forums. Through the process of continual re-articulation and re-framing of issues, epistemic 
communities are able to fine-tune social movement claims. This is most evident in the issues of 
contention that have apparently shed (or reframed) their ‗national‘ color and have taken on a 
markedly ‗European character.‘ 
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